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Of the three states that emerged from the remnants of the British Indian empire, 
India alone has avoided the experience of military rule. Both Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
which are making fitful attempts to restore democratic institutions, have witnessed long 
periods of military rule~often brutal to circumvent the aspirations of the majority of their 
population who live in abject poverty. Consequently, what is sought in this research is to 
understand the phenomenon of military rule in Bangladesh. 
The primary focus of this research, therefore, is the emergence of the Bangladesh 
military as a political entity in August of 1975. It is not the intention here to describe the 
various coups and counter coups that followed the August carnage, but rather an attempt 
has been made to analyze the socio-political nature of the regimes that have emerged and 
continues to dominate the political life of the society. 
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This study traces the social origins of Bangladesh military; its political advent; 
various 'social-engineering' it has pursued to stay in power and other 'means' to stifle 
dissent. When these aspects of 'praetorianism' are clearly focused the reader conjures up 
an image of blatant human rights violations and economic degradation perpetuated by one 
of Third World's most notorious armed forces -- the Bangladesh military. 
The thesis attempts to analyze the problems of Bangladesh's political development 
from a marxist perspective using the tool of class analysis to determine the nature of social 
formation since the military coup. Therefore, the paper rejects conventional frameworks 
which are either conservative or liberal for understanding Bangladesh's political 
development under military regimes and espoused a radical frame of reference, i.e., class 
analysis to perceive the 'situation' which has manifested in the growth of a military — 
bureaucratic oligarchy whose fortunes are intimately tied up with access to external 
resources in the name of 'modernizing' Bangladesh. 
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GLOSSARY 
Awami League: "People's League". Political party which led the 
liberation struggle against Pakistan in 1971. 
Bangabandhu: "Friend of Bengal". Title given to Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, Leader of Awami League. 
Biplobi Sainak: "Revolutionary Soldiers". 
BNP: Bangladesh Nationalist Party. The political party was 
formed by Bangladesh's first military dictator, General 
Ziaur Rahman. 
Bogra Mutiny: One of the more significant coup attempts against 
General Zia in 1978. 
Ghoosh: Bribe. 
Gram Sarkar: "Village government". 
Hartal: Strikes and demonstrations. 
JSD: National Socialist Party. 
Jamat-E-Islam: The Islamic Party. 
Jatio Party: The National Party. Formed by General Hossain 
Ershad, Bangladesh's second military dictator in 1985. 
Sarbohara Party: Proletarian Party. 
"Sepoy Biplob": "Soldiers Mutiny". 
Upazilla Parishad: District Council-administration unit established by 
General Ershad to replace General Zia's "Gram 
Sarkar". 
vi 
CHRONOLOGY OF IMPORTANT EVENTS 
1970 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's political party, Awami League, wins national 
parliamentary elections in Pakistan. In East Pakistan, the Awami League 
won 167 out of 169 seats allocated to East Pakistan in the National 
Assembly. 
1971 The Pakistan army and its political associates based in West Pakistan refuse 
to accept Sheikh Mujib as the elected head of government. The army 
attacks the unarmed population in East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib arrested and 
tansported to West Pakistan (1,000 miles away). Pakistan army massacres 
thousands of students, teachers, journalists, doctors and the Hindu 
population of East Pakistan. Following nine months of bloody civil war, 
East Pakistan secedes to become Bangladesh. 
1972 Sheik Mujib returns from Pakistan to head parliamentary government in 
Bangladesh. The Awami League government establishes the National 
Security Forces. 
1973 Defense expenditure curtailed. Regular army not to happy with the cuts. 
The National Socialist Party infiltrates the regular armed forces. 
1974 The underground 'revolutionary' forces attack government institutions, 
assassinates members of the Awami League. The National Socialist Party 
organizes massive demonstrations against the government. The Special 
Powers Act was enacted. The Act empowered the government to detain 
individuals without trial. 
1975 The leader of the underground 'revolutionary' forces was arrested and 
executed by the AL government. A group of "junior" officers staged a 
bloody military coup. Sheikh Mujib along with twenty-two members of his 
family were assassinated. Following a counter-coup and a soldiers 
"mutiny", General Zia emerged as a key figure. Military officers identified 
with the National Socialist Party demanded a "people's" army and a 
"socialist" economy. Leaders arrested and later executed by General Zia 
for "sedition". Martial Law enacted. 
1976 Defense budget revised upwards. Substantial funding was provided for the 
Defense Forces Intelligence and National Security Intelligence. The 
autonomy struggle in the Chittagong Hill Tracts intensifies. Opposition 
leaders arrested. 
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1977 Major industries de-nationalized. Saudi Arabia and United States become 
’reliable' ally of General Zia. Arms imported to quell the autonomy 
movement. A coup attempt against Zia was botched. Four hundred and 
sixty soldiers were tried and almost 300 executed after summary trial. 
1978 General Zia launched a new political party-the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP). The first office secretary of the BNP was an army officer. 
1979 'Parliamentary' elections "legitimizes" President Zia's government. 
1980 A "Disturbed Areas" bill was enacted which enabled the police and the 
military to shoot any person on "reasonable suspicion" in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts and other areas that were declared disturbed in Bangladesh. 
1981 Zia assassinated in a botched military coup. Vice President Sattar assumes 
the presidency. 
1982 Ershad removes Sartar in a military coup. Martial law enacted. 
1983 Violent clashes in the capital against military rule results in many deaths. 
1986 Ershad forms a political party-the Jatio Party. 'Elections' give Ershad a 
'majority' in parliament. 
1987 ’Parliament" validates all martial law proclamations since 1982. District 
Council (Zilla Parishad) bill which would have effectively strengthened the 
position of armed forces in all levels of government was withdrawn 
following massive protests and demonstrations. Many died all over 
Bangladesh to repel this law. 
1988 Opposition against Ershad intensifies. 
1989 Peace efforts in CHT fails, guerilla activities intensifies. The CHT has by 
now become a militarized zone. 
1990 Violent demonstrations against military rule culminates in mass action. 
1991 Mass demonstrations throughout Bangladesh forces Ershad to resign. 
Interim government is formed with the Chief Justice as acting president. 
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CHAPTER I 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The intervention of the military in politics is one of the most important 
developments in contemporary political discourse, particularly in the Third World where 
many societies are plagued by regimes hostile to democratic institutions and oblivious to 
economic and social justice. These regimes are controlled by the military either directly 
or by a civilian military alliance. 
Bangladesh has been in existence for twenty-two years. For more than sixteen 
years, the country has been under the heel of the military, whose major 'successes' have 
been to circumvent the democratic aspirations of its population. Since the birth of 
Bangladesh in 1971, there have been three important changes in government. In all the 
changes the primary actor was the military rather than the political parties. This represents 
the introduction of 'mercenary' politics into the social and political fabric of Bangladesh 
society. Men clad in Khaki in the safe confines of military barracks rather than mass 
participation in the political process decide the direction of the country's social, political, 
and economic programs. Indeed, the military leadership is in an unfettered position to 
determine political and economic goals and make all "decisions of decisive consequence" 
for the state. 
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Critics will surely point to the number of elections the military regimes have 
'arranged' in an effort to 'civilianize' the political process. However, these elections are 
'engineered' to provide a 'civilian' facade to policies and programs debated and initiated 
in the cantonments, and sometimes in 'parliament', in which the military backed political 
party invariably has the majority. Another important reason for the military to stage 
periodic elections is, of course, to win allies abroad and, thereby, pave the way for 
international aid. 
The overbearing influence of the military in Bangladesh leads one to believe that 
there are two consequential manifestations of this trend. Firstly, their overwhelming 
presence suggests that a degree of depoliticization of the masses may have been achieved 
and, secondly, a militarization of the civilian political process may also have occurred. 
Perhaps the first thing to note in this essay is how large is the sphere of activities 
in which the Bangladesh military is involved. It is deeply and pervasively involved in 
every aspect of economic, political, social and cultural life. Indeed, the former head of 
government removed a noted poet from a government newspaper editorial post for failing 
to attend the General's poetry session. The General's praetorian state is a permanent and 
active actor in class conflict and every other kind of conflict. It plays a decisive and 
growing role in the manipulation of opinion and in the 'engineering of consent'. It has in 
Max Weber's famous phrase, a 'monopoly of legitimate use of physical force'. On the 
external front, the country is 'mortgaged' to Japan and the United States, along with the 
World Bank and IMF which play decisive roles in articulating fiscal policies. Top military 
officers regularly visit other praetorian states like Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea 
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to study the political systems and institutions that might be emulated in Bangladesh. 
Young officers recently graduated from the Bangladesh Military Academy set off to distant 
shores to get advanced training in military intelligence and counter-insurgency. Most of 
these officers receive training in British and American military colleges. Civilian 
representatives of the military (Upazilla Chairman and Members of Parliament) are 
encouraged to explain the regime's 'options and programs' in their respective 
constituencies. Any serious threat to its stability is met by brute force in the form of 
martial law and suspension of basic human rights. The decisions of Martial Law Courts 
are excluded from the purview of the Supreme Court[l]. 
Internally, the military regime faces opposition from the Shanti Bahini (a guerilla 
army trying to fight the loss of their land and rights with a limited autonomy movement). 
Under the umbrella of 'counter-insurgency', the Bangladesh army has been systematically 
murdering the predominately Buddhist tribal people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 
Eastern Bangladesh. The interference of neighboring India has made matters worse. The 
regime has opted for a military solution to what is really a political problem. India has 
provided sanctuary and has armed the tribals to fight the Bangladesh military. 
However, the problem is not so much the military's emergence as a political entity, 
but rather its role as an armed protector of the economically privileged class in 
Bangladesh. The economic policies of the Junta clearly show a trend towards creating a 
rural elite since 84.33% of Bangladesh's population live in rural areas. Close to 80% of 
Bangladesh's population live below the poverty line [2]. State patronage of the dominant 
rural groups appears to have made these groups more close to the centers of power and 
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privilege. As a consequence of this patronage, rural Bangladesh is highly differentiated 
and its population displays a complex structure of big land-owners and tenants; big 
merchants and salesmen; rich money lenders and poor peasants; artisans and landless 
laborers; literates and illiterates, etc. This structural nature forms the basis and 
fundamental layer of inter-social class disparity in earnings and welfare. The most 
important factor causing high inequality in income distribution is the uneven distribution 
of land ownership and related assets. Bangladeshi development economists found that the 
distribution of land became more unequal during the late seventies when General Zia was 
in power [3]. Therefore, central to this analysis will be the contention that the Bangladesh 
military, however independent it may be politically, remains and cannot help but remain 
in a class society the protector of an economically and socially dominant class: the national 
bourgeoisie. Essentially this paper will be an attempt to analyze the nature of political 
developments in Bangladesh from a Marxist perspective. I remain resolute in my 
conviction, like several Bangladesh scholars who have equated the problem of 
underdevelopment with neo-classical economics, that a Marxian approach to the problem 
of political development in Bangladesh is capable of providing an alternative framework 
to the present structure. 
Methodology 
At this stage it is important to outline some of the difficulties encountered in 
articulating a methodology, given the poverty of available data and published materials on 
the role of the military in Bangladesh. Also, the fact that an objective critique of the 
military might antagonize the soldiers discourages scholars at home from gathering 
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materials critical of the military. This problem is well illustrated by a Bangladeshi scholar 
working on a dissertation in a Canadian University. He writes: 
Martial Law was declared in Bangladesh in March 1982. This created 
some problems that had not been anticipated; for example, it was not 
possible to interview politicians and civil servants as freely as I would have 
liked [4]. 
Notwithstanding the limitation faced by scholars in pursuing objective scholarship several 
locally published materials are rich in providing useful information about the conspiratorial 
nature of the Bangladesh military. 
Therefore, the paper has drawn heavily on empirical work on the military in Africa 
and Latin America -- the source of significant scholarship and brilliant analyses of 
praetorian regimes in those continents. The analyses of the post-colonial state in these 
works have greatly influenced the nature of the present study. 
Another methodological point worth noting is that the application of Marxist class 
analysis to the study of political development in any given Third World nation poses no 
fundamental problem, given the basic realities (economic, social and political) are the same 
in articulating a comprehensive study. For instance, to assume that the military in Uganda 
works for and on behalf of a ruling class like the military in Pakistan would in the final 
analysis remain a valid assumption based on Marxian class analysis of political 
development in the respective countries. The political indices are essentially the same. 
Therefore, data collected for this essay is primarily from secondary sources and 
government documents intended to unearth some fundamental assumptions about the role 
of the military in Bangladesh's politics, particularly, its role in accentuating Bangladesh's 
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poverty margin, with the help of the conceptual tool of Marxian class-analysis. Several 
problems with data collection are already noted. However, their inclusion or omission, 
I hope, would not seriously compromise my analysis and would ensure basis consistency 
in evaluating and adducing reasons for my findings. However, there is certainly a need 
for more empirical research studies to test the wider applicability of the findings. 
Literature Review 
The preponderance of the Armed Forces in the socio-political realm of Third World 
politics has generated an intense debate by several scholars. Morris Janowitz maintains 
that most military interventions are not necessarily praetorian conspiracies, but reactions 
to actual or perceived civilian incompetence [5]. There are others who argue that the 
military is a stabilizing force with the character and strength to modernize a nation [6]. 
However, Huntington argues that the military acts as a modernizing agent only when the 
interests of the middle class are concerned, but turns against social change when the lower 
classes demands radical structural change in society [7]. Clearly, then, in such situations 
the military acts as ally of the ruling class, assuming power to prevent further escalation 
of social tensions, particularly, the intensity of class conflict. In most cases the military 
opts to maintain the status quo. This view is best summed up by Nordlinger: 
In oligarchic societies, the soldier is a radical; in societies dominated by the 
middle class the officers act as arbiters among middle class groups; and 
when mass political participation is in sight the soldier protects the existing 
order. [8] 
There are also studies that point to the counter-revolutionary function of military 
intervention under conditions of the radicalization of mass politics. The case in question 
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is primarily the Chilean coup of 1973 [9], Indeed, there are others who consider military 
intervention as a new form of fascism. These authors argue that the fascist label seems 
appropriate because both the European interwar, and the Latin American military 
regime's, are dictatorships which stress nationalism and the objective of forging a new, 
purified order. Both also favor the consolidation of capitalism, resort frequently to the 
repression of opponents, with security organizations enjoying marked degrees of 
autonomy, and have a profound mistrust of independently organized working-class 
movements [10]. 
Bill Warren's article in the New Left Review. (1973) "Imperialism and 
Industrialization" tacitly implies that economic development brought about by the military 
in South Korea, Brazil and Argentina offers bright prospects for successful capitalist 
development for a good number of Third World countries. However, Warren's paper fails 
to comprehend the social costs of such 'economic miracles'. In most of the countries that 
Warren cited as having developed a strong economic infrastructure there has been 
widespread abuse of human rights to exact economic benefits for the ruling class. Trade 
unions are either banned or are allowed to function under strict conditions to meet 
production goals, which in any case, are for goods produced for external markets in the 
center. Also, it is important to bear in mind that economic development is not 
synonymous with political development, as the cases of Pakistan, South Korea and Brazil 
clearly illustrate this essay on the militarization of Bangladesh politics is also intended to 
reinforce this argument. Under Field Marshall Ayub Khan, Pakistan made striking 
economic advances in West Pakistan, financed by American aid and savings generated in 
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East Pakistan. But, Ayub's military regime neglected the nationalist demands of Bengalis 
in East Pakistan and willingly or unwillingly laid the seeds of secession, which finally 
culminated in the birth of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) in 1971. 
In a case study of Brazil, another author dispels the 'modernizing' impact of 
military rule. The author criticizes the view that following the coup in 1964, the Brazilian 
military displayed more 'cohesion', 'stability' or 'continuity of policy' than civilian 
politicians and analyzes the organizational cleavages within the military institution, and 
how these clevages relate to divisions in society as a whole and to divergent policies 
adopted by the military government. The author suggests that, despite the high economic 
rates of growth, the demobilization of 'all mass change-orientated movements', the 
inequitable fiscal stabilization policy, and the widespread use of torture have deeply 
inhibited social development [11]. 
In South Korea, the most important government agency responsible for economic 
policy is the Korean Development Institute (KDI); representatives of the World Bank and 
the IMF are on its staff. Professor Cummings, of the University of Washington, 
comments: 
Korea today, unlike in the 1950's, has the economy that the major market 
economies want it to have; this should be no surprise, since countries like 
the United States, Japan and West Germany, and organizations like the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have participated in 
planning South Korean development [12]. 
On the African scene, several authors have expressed doubts in various forms and 
in varying degrees in the ability of the military to bring about political stability and to 
stimulate economic growth and prosperity for the masses. Indeed, most African coups 
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have clearly demonstrated evidence of a community of interest between the national 
bourgeoisie and the army once the latter has seized power. For example, if the cases of 
Zaire and Nigeria are any index there are reasons to (assume and empirical data supports 
this assumption,) that bureaucrats and military officers do tend to acquire common 
interests in maintaining social division in society, maintaining corruption at a consistently 
high level, in engaging in lucrative real estate deals, in reaping the benefits of aid 
dispensation and more generally in engaging in conspicuous consumption. 
In an article, "The Role of the Army in African Politics: A Reconsideration of 
Existing Theories and Practices", Uma Eleazu rejects the 'modernizing' theories of the 
army, from an African perspective. Eleazu criticized the idea that the army is a modem 
institution capable of initiating fundamental change in society. Essentially it is military 
corporate self-interest and loyalty to the imperialist power, not nationalism, that motivates 
the soldier. Eleazu quotes, the Ghanaian General Afrifa in his accusation that Nkrumah 
broke the bond that binds us in this great union (the Commonwealth) of all races, colors 
and creeds [13]. 
Michel Martin [14] takes a similar line, in the African context. Central to Martin's 
argument is the notion of "revendication corporative" the defense or strengthening of the 
corporate interests of African armies is seen as the single most important element in the 
background of the 'militarization' of African states, and the tradition of "revendication 
corporative" as the historical thread that ties together various kinds of military coups over 
time and across national territories. Therefore, the key variable in Martin's analysis is 
"corporate interests" behind the occurrence of coups. Corporate grievances include threats 
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to the autonomy of the military, low pay and the improbability of belligerence across 
national boundaries. 
The main difficulty with Martin's argument is the rejection of the use of analysis 
to understand military behavior. For instance, Martin argues, the seizure of power by the 
military has little to do with the defense of class privileges, whether these are associated 
with those of a dominant or a subordinate class, and that African armies have repeatedly 
captured power even in the absence of actual or perceived threats to their economic 
interests. Surely, there is ample evidence to suggest that "corporate interests" of African 
armies also mean the maintenance of the dominant mode of production, i.e., the capitalist 
mode. 
As this essay unfolds, the reader will find concrete examples of coups that are 
specifically initiated to circumvent the possibility of revolutionary insurrection (as in 
Pakistan [1958], Iran [1958], Brazil [1964], Indonesia [1966] or to arrest the consolidation 
of revolutionary change as in Chile [1973], Zaire [1960],and Ghana [1966]. From this 
one can discern that "class" interest does play a significant motivating role in military 
coups and, therefore, counter Martin's argument that defense or enhancement of corporate 
privileges are not the sole determinant of military coups. 
Tariq Ali's book, Can Pakistan Survive? [15], [1982] shows a solid grasp of 
empirical materials available as well as an intimate knowledge of the theoretical literature 
on the military in Pakistan. The result is a brilliant essay, tightly argued and carefully 
researched. Central to Ali's argument is that the military in Pakistan has suffocated 
politics and society in general by repressive acts of violence and by invoking Islamic 
11 
"Sharia" (laws). Ali contends that any civilian government of the future would have to 
recognize the military as a permanent force in the political life of the country. Yet any 
political party which agreed to that would sign its own death warrant. Indeed, political 
developments since General Zia Huque's death bears testimony to Ali's understanding of 
Pakistani politics. Benezir Bhutto's flirtation with ideals of democratic government was 
cut short in 1990 when she was sacked as the Prime Minister by the military backed 
president of Pakistan. Therefore, a civilian government totally divorced from military 
influence is unlikely to emerge given the present political structure of Pakistan. This 
paradox also holds true of Bangladesh. 
Several authors argue that economic "backwardness" is a necessary condition for 
the occurrence of military coups [16]. Based on empirical data these authors maintain that 
coups are almost non-existent in developed countries. Their findings show a pronounced 
inverse relationship between coups and income; coups are 21 times more likely to occur 
among the poorest countries in their sample than among the wealthiest. However, this 
model is, for the most part, a historical and ideological. 
Whatever the factors of military coups in the Third World, neither Londregan nor 
Keith satisfactorily explain the association between frequent occurrences of military coups 
in the Third World and the almost non-existence of military coups in advanced 
industrialized countries. I would argue that the colonial and post colonial history of many 
Third World nations reflects a social formation that has enriched the affluent countries at 
the expense of poorer countries. Military coups are a by-product of the conditions that 
imperialism and neo-colonialism have created in the peripheries of world economies. 
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Also, military involvement in politics cannot be understood solely by reference to 
a country's economic backwardness; rather, military involvement is inversely related to 
the level of country's political culture. The military steps is when other institutions of the 
government are relatively weak or when they fail. 
Finally, there are several works published by Bangladeshi scholars at home and 
abroad pertaining to the role of the military in Bangladesh. 
Zillur Khan's book, Martial Law to Martial Law. [17], explores the relationship 
between civilian and military leadership with special focus on the tensions that exists 
between the two. Also of concern to Khan is the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism in 
Bangladesh which seems to have grown, since, General Zia, the first military ruler, had 
deleted secularism from the constitution of Bangladesh. 
Aleem-al-Razee's scholarly work, Constitutional Glimpses of Martial Law in India. 
Pakistan, and Bangladesh [18] begins with India's first martial law regulations that were 
introduced by the colonial power-Britain (incidentally the first martial law was passed in 
Bengal of which Bangladesh was a part). Razee shows how detention without trial (still 
in vogue) has a long history, and that both Pakistan and Bangladesh have been adding to 
a stock of old colonial regulations. Since Razee was trained as a lawyer (he died in 1985), 
he understands the legal cases which are used both to entrench or to undermine martial 
law. His is an insiders' view, showing the constitutional arguments rather than social 
movements, against the abuse of power by military governments in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. 
Emajuddin Ahamed's book, Military Rule and the Myth of Democracy [19], 
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converges with Al-Razee's because both of them discuss the politicization of the military 
after the independence of Bangladesh. Ahamed explains in detail how a military force of 
about 100,000 men could seize power in 1975 and (with brief interruption) hold it to this 
day in a country with a population of 110 million. The author examines the social 
composition of the military and the vital tensions between those who fought for Bangladesh 
and those who were repatriated from Pakistan following independence (like the present 
ruler, General Ershad). 
Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood, by Anthony Mascarenhas [20], also examines the 
tensions within the military leadership in Bangladesh, and convincingly exposes the web 
of conspiracies that often led to violent suppression of oppositional challenges from within 
the Junta. Mascarhenas refers to Colonel Taher who aided General Zia and was later 
hanged by Zia who felt threatened by Taher's's proposition to radically alter the decision 
making process in Bangladesh. Taher wanted to establish a Central Revolutionary Army 
Organization along Chinese line, which would decide all policies and 'link up' with 
revolutionary students, workers, peasants, and masses. Most importantly, it was 
emphasized that General Zia 'should not take any decision without first consulting this 
body. ' 
Another publication which has documented the social, political, and economic 
conditions of Bangladesh fairly objectively is one edited by Khan and Thorp [21]. There 
are several well researched essays in the book. Barua discusses the emergence of military 
rule in Bangladesh by contrasting the social structures of Bangladesh and its erstwhile 
partner Pakistan. Habiba Zaman, then documents the chain of events that brought, first, 
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General Zia to power and then General Ershad. Central to Zaman's concern are aborted 
attempts by General Zia to legitimize his military rule in the face of tremendous 
opposition. A paper by M.Q. Zaman discusses, briefly, the political economy of Zia's 
rule, particularly, Zia's attempt to win over the rich peasantry by introducing 'policies' 
and 'incentives' that benefited them. According to Zaman, these 'policies' and 'initiatives' 
were introduced to "keep him in power". Zia's rural mobilization scheme was actively 
supported and channeled through the local bureaucracy, an important element, in the 
military's drive to de-politicize the masses. 
The arguments made by Zaman also laid the basis for Huques's more 
comprehensive study of Zia's rural mobilization programs. Ahmed Shafiqul Huque's 
study Politics and Administration in Bangladesh: Problems of Participation [22], critically 
examines the 'ill-fated' attempts of General Zia to establish Gram Sarkar (local village 
government). Although this attempt failed to win the 'masses' over to Zia's political 
party, it did help to create a rural elite. The rural elite actively engaged in the process of 
'legitimating' Zia's regime. 
The attempts by the military leadership to maintain a 'strategic' alliance with the 
rich peasantry, as well as 'other' consequences of military rule in Bangladesh, is also 
documented by Golam Hossain in his book, Civil-Military Relations in Bangladesh: A 
Comparative Study [23]. Hossain also attempts to distinguish between the two military 
rulers: Zia and Ershad. His sympathies, of course, are with Zia who 'helped to create an 
effective parliament' as opposed to General Ershad who has 'so far conspicuously failed 
to bring the major political parties into the electoral process.' Therein lies Hossain's 
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flawed objectivity. Given the overtly repressive nature of General Zia and Ershad's 
government's, it is difficult to sustain that inducting a few hundred civilian 
'representatives' into a 'rubber-stamp' parliament gives any semblance of 'legitimacy'. 
Is Dr. Hossain oblivious to the 'social-engineering' of Zia's regime? Or is he hesitant to 
indulge in a critique of Zia's regime for fear of offending some 'vested' interests? 
Surprisingly there are not many publications that endeavor to bring to light the 
political and military problems faced by the Bangladesh army in their quest to crush the 
'autonomy' movement of the ethnic population in Southeastern Bangladesh. The 
availability of relatively little material in this 'sensitive' area tends to obscure rather than 
enlighten the true nature of Bangladesh's military rule. Therefore, this paper shall seek 
to address the problems associated with the military operation by relying on materials 
published outside Bangladesh. These are: Amnesty International, Human Rights Internet 
Reporter, Far Eastern Economic Review, Asia Week, Index on Censorship, and Asian 
Review. I only indicate some of the major ones that have informed my discussion. 
Insofar as the economy is concerned, several scholarly works are prepared by 
Bangladeshi authors, who have critically examined the economic policies of the military 
governments. These books offer rich insight into the 'pauperization' of the masses caused 
by the military leaders' 'poverty-elimination programs'. Atiur Rahman's compelling 
work, Peasants and Classes: A Study in Differentiation of Bangladesh [24], examines the 
'means' of 'pauperization' which manifests itself into 'landlessness' as the rich enlarge 
their landholdings and other material elements of production. Rahman argues that rural 
proletarization is making slow but sure headway due to traditional relations of production 
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and exchange because of to capitalist penetration. Rahman, of course, blames the state 
represented by the military for 'mass impoverishment' and 'political unrest'. Rahman 
concludes by categorically stating that since the penetration of capitalism into the agrarian 
economy of Bangladesh has failed to bring about qualitative change in the lives of the 
peasants, socialist transformation may prove more useful to Bangladesh in its pursuit to 
solve 'polarization' and 'immiserization' of the peasantry—eight four percent of the 
Bangladesh's population. 
Syed Islam's book, Bangladesh: State and Economic Strategy [25], also provides 
an excellent overview of the economic policies pursued by General Zia and Ershad. Islam 
argues that the survival of the state under Zia and Ershad depended primarily on the 
loyalty of the armed forces. Accordingly, they raised the defense budget at the expense 
of other sectors of the economy. Also, the perks enjoyed by military officers and soldiers 
helped to create deep divisions in society, which if allowed to continue, will intensify class 
conflict. This view is also reinforced in Rehman Sobhan's, The Crisis of External 
Dependence: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh [26]. 
Rehman's provocative study basically complements Islam's and Rahman's 
contention that a class of nouveau riche has emerged in Bangladesh due to the economic 
policies, adopted by the military regimes of Generals Zia and Ershad. As a result of these 
policies the gap between the rich and poor has widened. The role of foreign capital, 
aggressively pursued by these generals, has led to dependent development that has 
contributed little to eradicate poverty in Bangladesh. On the contrary, these policies have 
accentuated concentration's in the ownership of wealth and inequality in the distribution 
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of income without significant expansion of the productive forces within the economy. 
Foreign aid, which poured in generously since the first military coup in 1975, has served 
to reinforce a system which has relied minimally on domestic resource mobilization and 
the effective use of productive capacities. Consequently, Rehman argues, the 
governments' economic policies has tended to foster the growth of a class of dependent 
consumers, who could in fact have been motivated to more productive effort under a 
different social dispensation. 
Echoing similar statements, Atiq Rahman's policy paper, Domestic Resource 
Mobilization in Bangladesh: A Macro-Analysis [27], argues that aid dependency tends to 
frustrate mobilization of potential savings and debt repayments burden on Bangladesh has 
started to exert pressure on its fragile economy. 
As a result of Bangladesh's increased dependence on aid, interest payments and 
amortization on foreign loans as a percentage of export earnings has already approached 
the psychological limit of 20 percent. One dollar out of every five earned through exports 
is now paid as interest and repayment of the principal. 
The other negative impact of foreign aid is corruption. Extremely critical of 
Ershad's economic policy, Muhammad Yumus noted economist of Bangladesh comments: 
Foreign aid has helped breed corruption, bring unprecedented prosperity for 
a handful of people, created regimes which can ignore the desires and needs 
of the people [28]. 
Again, a significant portion of what is labelled as development expenditure goes 
to finance recurrent expenditure, defense being at the top of it. 
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Consequently, the military's assertion that it is bent on alleviating the misery of the masses 
is clearly a sham and fraud. 
Finally, Sayed Kamal writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review [29] reports 
on General Ershad's resolve to institutionalize the military in the political process. Kamal 
observes that an Indonesian style of government keeping a democratic facade may be 
finally chosen by the military. Indeed recent developments in Bangladesh confirms 
Kamal's observation. For example, Ershad's decision to launch a political party and 
introduce village government in Bangladesh leads credence to the views expressed in 
Kamal's article. However, what remains to be seen in whether such a move by Ershad 
would in reality circumvent the politics of mass consent given the overtly political nature 
of Bangladeshi's. Is it conceivable that Bangladesh would accept a political force so alien 
to their political culture? Are Bangladeshis prepared to accept that their leaders would 
emerge from the barracks and the military academies? Has the military been a factor of 
political stability and economic development or has it intensified the conditions of class 
struggle in Bangladesh? These are issues and problems which must be addressed by 
Bangladeshis before long. 
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CHAPTER H 
SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE BANGLADESH MILITARY 
"The history of militarism is the history of class struggles within class 
struggles within individual states and national units." 
Karl Liebknecht[l] 
Historically most coups in the Third World are staged to offset the potential of 
revolutionary advance in those societies. Examples of such conservative militarism include 
the coups against Mossadegh in Iran, Lumumba in the Congo, Sukarno in Indonesia and 
Allende in Chile. 
This view assumes that the military in Third World essentially represents the 
interests of the bourgeoisie. There is much empirical evidence to test this hypothesis. For 
example, Tariq Ali, in his book Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power [2], enables 
us to understand the class interests of the Pakistan army. The military in Pakistan staged 
their first coup in 1958. By 1960, the economic policies of Ayub Khan, the military 
dictator, were manifested in twenty Pakistani families controlling 66 percent of the 
industrial capital, 80 percent of banking, and 97 percent of the country's insurance. At 
the same time, the peasantry in Pakistan (almost 90% of its population) was reduced to 
extreme 'pauperization'. In short, the process of capitalist development in Pakistan 




The contradictions of such an uneven development led to violent protests by 
peasants, students and workers. Finally in 1971, the masses had begun a revolt that 
witnessed the dismemberment of Pakistan and the creation of independent Bangladesh 
(formerly East Pakistan). However, this "flag" independence for Bangladesh did little to 
address the basic problem of inequality and the new elites lack of responsiveness to the 
needs and aspirations of its own people led to a new revolutionary momentum. As was 
the case in Pakistan, the Bangladesh military also decided to strike in 1975. This tragically 
cut short the revolutionary advance of the masses. The decision by the Bangladesh 
military leaders clearly reinforces the view made earlier that the military in the Third 
World, with a few exceptions (Kemalist version in Turkey), intervene to consolidate the 
hegemony of the dominant class — the bourgeoisie with which it identifies itself. 
Therefore, the question that easily grapples the mind is: Which is the dominant 
class? Logically, following from this question, What are the interests of this class? To 
answer these questions and relate them to the political reality of military rule in 
Bangladesh, it is necessary firstly to assess the role of the military as perceived by 
Marxists, and secondly, to define the concept of class as understood in marxist theory. 
For Marx and Engels, the standing army is needed only because of the authorities 
fear of revolution; and "fear of revolution is indeed only a consequence of a conflict of 
interests; where all interests coincide there can be no thought of such fear" [3]. This 
viewpoint is put more strongly in "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" where 
Marx talked of the destruction of the bureaucratic military machinery, and described it as 
'the precondition1 of any real popular revolution on the continent [4], Little wonder, then, 
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Marx considered the military as one of ubiquitous organs of centralized state power, along 
with the police, bureaucracy, clergy and judiciary [5]. In an essay which essentially is a 
biting critique of the African bourgeoisie, Fanon agrees with Marx, and situates the 
military in the context of Third World societies. Fanon writes: 
In these poor, underdeveloped countries, where the rule is that the greatest 
wealth is surrounded by the greatest poverty, the army and the police 
constitute the pillars of the regime. . . The strength of the police force and 
the power of the army are proportionate to the stagnation in which the rest 
of the nation is sunk. [6] 
Althusser, following Marx, also equates the army as a repressive organ of the state 
which is called in to restore 'order' in times of crisis. The military then is a "force of 
repression and intervention that shields the bourgeoisie and its allies in the class struggle 
against the proletariat" [7]. This view was clearly demonstrated in Uganda by Amin in 
1971. Immediately following the coup, Amin unleashed the military to commit acts of 
extreme barbarism against the people from many ethnic groups in the country and from 
all the Christian denominations. Soon after the coup in 1971, Amin stopped state 
assistance to poor dairy farmers. As a result, many farmers became landless and moved 
away from the food surplus area of Busheny. However, the subsidy to rich farmers 
remained in tact. The decision to cut-off assistance to poor farmers was meant to dislodge 
them and have them replaced by soldiers loyal to Amin. The appropriation of private and 
natural property belonging mostly to poor peasants helped Amin to create a comparatively 
privileged military elite. Within a matter of months these soldiers became extremely rich 
and powerful. 
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In short, what was taking place was the systematic annihilation of the "negative coalition" 
against Amin [8]. 
Similar representations of the military officers corps engaged in repressive 
functions on behalf of the state can be found in the annals of Chilean, El Salvadorean, 
Zairian, Pakistani, Indonesian and Argentinean history among others. Indeed, the history 
of militarism is couched in acts of violence against those who oppose it. It is true that the 
Western media makes a passing reference to Third World military coups when they occur. 
However, no serious attempt is made to portray the brutality that follows, and to explain 
the 'historical' origins of a coup. Such focus would expose the 'invisible' hand behind the 
'repression', and in some instances, the United States, s the 'invisible' hand (more in 
Chapter IV). For the United States and other advanced capitalist societies, the majority 
of the Third World people are not considered to be a legitimate political or social force; 
and so, for example, the struggle in El Salvador is viewed as involving a few thousand 
'Maoist' guerrillas and the army. 
The broad masses of the people are assumed to be merely inert or, perhaps, "caught 
in the crossfire". From 1966 to 1968, the Guatemalan army-with U.S. aid, training, and 
advisors—killed an estimated 6,000 to 8,000 people in order to stamp out the Marxist 
guerilla movement in the country, and when this repression failed to defeat militant 
opposition to rule by the military, death squads were established in the 1970s to 
exterminate the peasants, union leaders, and students who had demonstrated support for 
the guerrillas. There are also examples of massacre even when no ties to guerilla activities 
could be established [9]. Having explained briefly Marx's and Engel's positions, viz aviz 
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the military and by alluding to empirical references of the military's 'repressive' function, 
I shall now delve into the social origins of the Bangladesh military. 
Social Origins 
Hamza Alavi correctly labels the military in Bangladesh as a colonial creation [10], 
although Bangladeshis' were poorly represented in the British Indian, and subsequently, 
the Pakistan army, because of their 'volatile' nature [11]. Those who were recruited were 
carefully screened: their class background and political outlook were considered 
impeccable [12]. In fact, this kind of screening dates back to days of British colonialism, 
when the Bengalees in the British army staged a mutiny, popularly known as the "Sepoy" 
mutiny, to restore the Mughal emperor to his former status. The British Raj, obviously 
concerned, initiated a policy to exclude those who took part in the mutiny, particularly, 
the Bengalees, and took steps to recruit those who helped them suppress it, the Punjabis 
[13]. The quasi-fascist concept of 'martial races' was introduced to exclude the Bengalees 
and the Punjabis, who had sided strongly with the British during the mutiny were honored 
as a 'martial race' and 'good soldiers', and henceforth were even more heavily recruited 
into the British Indian army. The racial myths that the British military ideology 
propagated contained the same admixture of prejudice and paternalism. Bengalis (people 
of Bangladesh are known as Bengalis) were short and dark; they could not fight well; they 
were natural cowards. These racial myths survived when East Bengalis became part of 
Pakistan and Bengalees, inspite of being the majority of Pakistan's population, were once 
again excluded from the Pakistan army as Table 2.1 clearly shows because they could not 
be politically trusted. 
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Table 2.1 
The Distribution of Armed Forces between 
East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (now Pakistan) 
1964 Fiaures 
ARMY WEST PAKISTAN EAST PAKISTAN 
1. Officers 95.00 5.00 
2. Other Ranks 92.06 7.04 
THE AIR FORCE 
1. Officers 84.00 16.00 
2. Other Ranks 70.00 30.00 
THE NAVY 
1. Officers 90.00 10.00 
2. Other Ranks 82.07 17.03 
Source: Emajuddin Ahamed, Bureaucratie Elite in Segmented Economie Growth: 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. (University Press Limited, 1980), 69. 
In 1970, the equilibrium hardly changed. There was only one Lieutenant General 
from East Pakistan [14]. Notwithstanding this discrepancy in numbers and the racial 
myths, Bengali masses defeated the 'colonial' Pakistan army in 1971 after a prolonged 
battle in the villages and towns of East Pakistan. There were, of course, tragic losses: 
about three million people were killed. Indeed, Tariq Ali writes: 
In the first two weeks of the massacre more people may have been killed 
in East Bengal than have died in Vietnam in the last ten years, even with 
the American bombing. [15] 
The Bengali population's 'heightened' political consciousness made it extremely 
difficulty for them to be recruited into the Pakistan army. Consequently, those recruited 
were mainly from a petit-bourgeois background, whose parents presumably identified with 
West Pakistan's bourgeoisie and its Punjabi, bureaucratic-military oligarchy. 
28 
Also, the potential recruits commitment to "muslim nationalism" was considered 
important since secular Bengali Muslims were identified as pro-Hindu and, therefore, a 
threat to the communal interests of Pakistan's ruling class. 
These directions of recruitment obviously changed with the birth of Bangladesh and 
adoption of 'secularism' in the new constitution of 1971. The class base of recruitment 
also changed somewhat, particularly after the establishment of military rule in 1975. 
Recruits from the upper classes began to wane. From 1975 there began a transformation 
from a rather small socially homogeneous officers corps, into a broad based heterogenous 
group. The new recruits were a cross-section of middle and lower-middle classes. The 
middle class is rather diverse, including as it does, teachers, civil servants, lawyers, 
technicians, shop owners, traders, medium and small entrepreneurs along with military 
officers. These class fractions in Marxist parlance would be the petit-bourgeoisie. 
A strong argument for the lack of upper class recruits would be the absence of a 
Bengali bourgeoisie, due to prolonged years of colonialism, first under the British, and 
then Pakistan. This 'double jeopardy' for Bangladesh was instrumental in creating small 
businessmen rather than captains of industry. The greed and economic policies pursued 
by the West Pakistani military-bureaucracy hardly left Bengalis' any choice other than to 
wage a struggle for liberation. This view seems to be supported by Thomas W. Oliver in 
his scholarly work The United Nations in Bangladesh [1978]. 
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The author states: 
There seems no doubt that in the years preceding independence real per 
capita income in what is now Bangladesh remained virtually static and 
probably declined. The stagnation in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), 
which contrasted sharply with impressive and widely praised growth in 
West Pakistan (now Pakistan), was the outcome of several related factors, 
among them the development policies of the government of Pakistan. 
These policies, which were regarded by major donor governments as a 
model of their kind, were designed to promote development through 
industrialization. Their effects on the predominately agricultural economy 
of East Pakistan were disastrous. Through the operation of the system of 
multiple exchange rates and import control resources were transferred from 
agriculture, mainly in East Pakistan to support industrialization which was 
concentrated in the west wing. The foreign exchange proceeds of exporting 
of raw jute from East Pakistan were, for example, bought by the 
government at low rates and used to import capital goods and materials that 
were sold to industrialists at advantageous prices, [p. 15] 
A recent study [16] shows that 3/4 of the officers of the Bangladesh Armed Forces 
were born in the middle class, about 15-20 percent in upper classes and about 10-15 
percent in the lower classes. Most were recruited from rural Bangladesh. The leaders of 
the military coup in 1975 were sons of government officials, trained in the Pakistan 
Military Academy and abroad, some were sons of affluent farmers and teachers. Thirty- 
two military officers who served as government ministers during the military regimes of 
General Zia and Ershad, were sons of landed gentry and government officials. Many 
officers who were involved in the assassination of General Zia in an aborted military coup 
were also sons of government officials, lawyers and teachers. 
Although the class representation of military officers has changed, the training and 
socialization of the armed forces continues in the 'colonial' mode. Many Bangladeshi 
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military officers were nurtured and trained in prestigious military academies of Britain and 
the United States. Their vision of the world is somewhat influenced by the political 
culture of their former masters which essentially 'transmitted Sandhurst jingoism into a 
new indigenous form' [17]. Colonial military institutions have been emulated like the 
Bangladesh Military Academy in the city of Chittagong. Within its gates, the academy 
undertakes the selection, socialization, and professionalization of the country's military 
officers, preparing them to join a closely knit corps, whose members hold significant 
positions of power at all levels in Bangladesh's government. The screening process is an 
elaborate and thorough investigation into the potential cadets background, thus ensuring 
non-political recruitment. Most of the cadets, before entering the Academy, obtained their 
earlier education from schools of credible reputation in rural and urban areas and from 
cadet colleges. Recruits from this outstanding institution are generally seen to be isolated 
from the masses because of their elitist nature [18]. 
The virtual monopoly of the Military Academy in the preparation of officers, and 
the central position of the officer corps in the Bangladeshi structure of power, means that 
in many ways the Academy is the most consequential elite-forming institution in the 
nation. [19]. The military, which has come to wield so much power since the coup in 
1975, does so from an especially tiny numerical base. In 1989, there were 103,000 men 
in uniform, only 8,000 are commissioned officers. Also, following the coup, the strength 
of the police force was increased from about 40,000 men to about 70,000. A special 
Reserved Armed Police Battalion and a metropolitan police force for Dhaka were also 
created [20]. Later, other major cities like Chittagong and Khulna, were also provided 
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with Reserved Armed Police. These increases were made necessary by the persistent 
demonstrations, strikes and violent agitation against the ruling Junta. 
How this small corps of officers has gained so much power and privilege over so 
many is in part a story of imperial interests (including the international financial 
institutions and aid programs) which are deeply involved in opposing developments that 
would benefit the majority. Indeed, Cheryl Payer's research into the role of World Bank 
in Bangladesh reinforces this argument. Explaining some wasteful and elite forming 
World Bank projects in Bangladesh, Payer illustrates the case of Nafis, an affluent farmer 
in a village: 
In theory, tubewells were supposed to be purchased and used by twenty- 
five to fifty farmers grouped into cooperatives formed for this purpose. 
But in reality, the tubewell in the village was considered the personal 
property of one man: Nafis, the biggest landlord of the area. Nafis got the 
$14,000 tubewell by virtue of political influence, at a cost of less than $300 
in bribes to local officials, and installed it on his own land, where he could 
irrigate thirty acres. This is only half the size of the area capacity of the 
tubewell, but the price Nafis planned to charge neighboring small farmers 
for use of the water is so high that the well will not be used to its full 
capacity. Nafis is the only beneficiary of the project in his village and,-- 
if the tubewell succeeds in raising his income - he will probably use that 
income to purchase plots to add to his own, driving the previous owners 
into landlessness. [21] 
Clearly, this illustration show that World Bank projects in Bangladesh are simply 
to support and strengthen the recipient government, in this case a military government 
intimately allied with local landlords such as Nafis. Therefore, the Bank and other 
international financial institutions play an important role in perpetuating and sustaining 
class differences that manifest into growth 'retardation' and unequal relationships. 
In preparation of a dominant ideology, military officers are exposed to several 
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different kinds of orientation, ranging from books to war college courses, that engage in 
a broad understanding of market economics, international leadership, counter-insurgency 
training, and internal security. The Academy is like a university in which they enroll after 
completing higher secondary school examinations. In two years, these officers are 
awarded Bachelor degrees, which would ordinarily take four years for the rest of the 
student population.. When these cadets graduate from the Academy, some are sent off to 
the United States, Britain, and Canada for advanced degrees. These are usually the 
'brightest' among their peers, who return home thoroughly oriented in bourgeois values. 
Military officers with foreign training and foreign edcation are offered excellent 
opportunities in civil occupations. Therefore, to young recruits of petit-bourgeois 
backgrounds, a military career is not only a real possibility, but also a desirable one, since 
they can maintain and often enhance, their social and economic standing. Indeed, the 
advent of military rule in Bangladesh has witnessed the upward social mobility of military 
officers, which brings them 'prestige' and the expectation that their role in the nation's 
history will be accorded honor by future generation of soldiers. Between 1976-90, twenty- 
three military officers served as government ministers, twenty-seven served as Ambassador 
or High Commissioner and eighty-five high ranking military officers during 1987-88 were 
placed in public offices [22]. Almost all were placed in important ministries to ensure the 
hegemony of the armed forces over the civil bureaucracy. This establishment of 'public 
power' is necessary for the armed forces to keep the 'citizens in check', and to show to 
the ruling class that its class interests could be preserved by some outside force of coercion 
[23]. But more immediately, there is another lesson. By occupying these important public 
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offices, the military leaders are involved in high-state corruption and earn illegal 
commission when negotiating lucrative deals with foreign companies. Retired military 
officers are also co-opted in various bureaucratic positions; if positions are not available, 
or if a certain officer is not interested in the job that was offered, chances are that the 
officer or officers will be encouraged from the 'top' to open a commercial trading 
company in the capitals business district where leasing office space is an expensive 
proposition. Some of Bangladesh's most lucrative defense related contracts are negotiated 
in these offices [24]. These 'perks' and access to profitable 'deals' have enabled a 
significant number of military officers and their allies in the civil bureaucracy to 
substantially better their economic and social standing in society. Indeed, the Washington 
Post reports: "Many of the land transfers recently recorded are to army officers, senior 
bureaucrats and police" [25]. 
Hence, to the extent that the Bangladeshi military officers develop a capitalist 
perspective and recognize that it requires political intervention, they can be viewed as 
allies of the ruling class willing to bail them out in times of extreme crisis. They do not 
fundamentally challenge the bourgeois privilege and hegemony, but rather engage in 
coercion and manipulation to seal the weak links in the state. Over a period of time the 
armed forces emerge as a vocal champion, rather than a new class, bent on complementing 
the framework of existing relations of production. This brings us to the concept of class 
in which the military identifies its interests. However, even at the risk of digressing, it 
is important to briefly discuss the political reality of Bangladesh prior to the military coup. 
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End of Constitutional Politics: The Military Coup 
Bangladesh witnessed its first military coup in August of 1975 with tragic 
consequences for "Bangabandhu' Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the President. Along with 
thirty close relatives, including his eight year old son Russell, the 'Bangabandhu' was 
murdered in the wee hours of the morning. The coup was led by a group of 'junior' 
military officers. 
Immediately after the coup, the military argued that the coup had been essential to 
save Bangladesh from the Awami League, the political party led by Sheikh Mujib. It is 
perfectly true that Bangladesh's politics was notoriously unstable, and the country's 
political and economic institutions were new and extremely weak. Sheikh Mujib's 
decision to raise a para-military force with India's help also seemed to upset the Armed 
Forces. Smuggling and corruption were rampant. To add to these was the famine in 1974, 
which killed an estimated 100,000 people all over Bangladesh. Internationally, Sheikh 
Mujib was under intense pressure from the United States and the financial institutions to 
privatize the economy and sever economic relations with Cuba. Otherwise, PL. 480, 
under which the United States supplied food aid to Bangladesh, would be curtailed. 
(Mujib obliged and the pro-Moscow, Finance Minister, Tajjudin Ahmed was sacked before 
Kissinger arrived in Dhaka for a short trip.) These were, however, not the real reasons 
for the coup. 
I would argue that during the last years of Mujib's rule, the left oriented parties, 
frustrated with Mujib's wavering commitment to the principles of socialism, seriously 
began to challenge the government in 1972. 'Hartals' (national strikes) became a routine 
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expression of opposition distrust for Mujib's economic and social policies, which were 
perceived to favor the bourgeoisie. Underground peasant parties launched massive 
military operations against the state, police stations were attacked to steal arms for the 
revolutionary forces. These engagements led to heavy casualties on both sides. The 
revolutionary parties recruited a large number of students and workers from rural areas. 
They were trained in various secret locations, training which included orientation in the 
fundamental 'contradictions' of Bangladesh propounded by Shiraj Sikder, the civil 
engineer turned revolutionary leader of the dominant peasant party. These 'contradictions' 
as specified by Sikder were instrumental in sustaining the hegemonic positions of external 
powers like India, Soviet Union, and the United States. Internally, the class forces, 
namely the petit-bourgeois AL, which has identified with these 'expansionist' forces, must 
be overthrown because they perpetuate the capitalist division of labor, and must be 
replaced by a revolutionary committee consisting of 'students', 'workers' and 'peasants'. 
This line of revolutionary class struggle represented by Sikdar was known as "Maoist'. 
To this end, the 'Maoist' forces also carried out political assassinations in various parts of 
Bangladesh, including those of several Awami League members of parliament who were 
branded as 'national enemies'.[26] Indeed, the threat of Sikdar's revolutionary mass 
upheaval became so intense that the state had to declare an 'Emergency' on December 26, 
1973 [27], However, the East Bengal Sarbohara Party (Proletarian Party) led by Sikdar 
was plagued with leadership and personality conflicts. Soon these weaknesses within the 
party resulted in a leadership crisis, and with the incessant hounding of revolutionary 
activists by the state, the Proletarian Party failed to consolidate its 'gains' and succumbed 
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to government pressure. Sikdar was arrested and executed by the government's repressive 
security force, Rakhi Bahini, on 2 January 1975. 
Meanwhile, another Marxist party, the Jatio Samajtrantik Dal (National Socialist 
Party), composed mainly of dissident Marxist student leaders within the AL, was floated 
in 1972. The leaders of this party regarded the AL, 'as the representative of the Bengali 
bourgeois class and, therefore, must be overthrown'[28]. The JSD had also infiltrated the 
Bangladesh military, where it hoped to indoctrinate the soldiers to serve the masses instead 
of rightist reactionaries and pro-American elements within the army [29]. Consequently, 
the first military officer to be hanged for a politically 'incorrect' position was Colonel Abu 
Taher, who had demanded a 'People's Army' as opposed to a regular army soon after the 
coup that brought General Zia to power in 1975. Abu Taher secretly worked for the JSD, 
and believed that a 'real' socialist transformation of Bangladesh society was possible from 
'above'. 
Clearly, the events building up to the military coup show the existence of class 
struggle within and outside the armed forces. Sheikh Mujib's experiment with socialism 
was purely cosmetic; several factories were nationalized, but more important issues like 
land reform, central to any fundamental restructuring of society, was marginalized and was 
never seriously addressed as a tool for the elimination of poverty. The pertinent question 
for Sheikh Mujib, therefore, was: is it possible to become free from Capitalism and move 
toward Socialism without Marxism? Secondly, is it possible to maintain independence 
within the framework of underdevelopment without challenging imperialist trade relations? 
What is socialism without the development of a revolutionary consciousness among the 
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masses? Why were peasants and workers not armed with this consciousness, which would 
have enabled them to fight class interest and privilege? Sheikh Mujib clearly had the 
mandate to initiate such fundamental changes; he chose not to do it. Therefore, when he 
died in a hail of bullets on 15 August 1975, the masses remained totally oblivious to the 
tragedy that unfolded in the capital, Dhaka. From the above discussion, it can be discerned 
given the serious threats to the AL government from Marxist forces, that strong 
possibilities of radical advance were gradually creeping into the structure of the new and 
weak state. The national bourgeoisie was in a state of near panic. So the military taking 
opportunity of the prevalent political conditions decided to circumvent the development 
of a 'revolutionary consciousness', substituting itself for a homogenous ruling class and 
a strong political party alike. 
The Bangladesh coup in many ways can be compared to Michael Lofchie's [30] 
analysis of the Uganda coup staged by Idi Amin against Milton Obote. Lofchie has 
interpreted the Uganda coup as a pure case of a 'middle class' (with the army as its agent) 
resisting a potential social initiative. Certainly, Mujib's failure to contain the 
revolutionary potential of JSD, in particular, clearly antagonized his petit-bourgeois 
constituency which included the armed forces. 
Clearly, then, the strong threats to the state from various radical forces have shown 
us the existence of class struggle. What shape it takes and who are the actors in this 
struggle highlights the relevance of 'class' analysis, to which we now turn. 
We know that the philosophy underlying Marxism is "dialectical materialism", and 
the application of the principles of "dialectical materialism" to the study of history is called 
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'historical materialism'; which is sometimes referred to as "materialist conception of 
history" or "economic interpretation of history". In every society, including Bangladesh, 
this dialectic operates through the struggle between its different social classes. Thus the 
history of any society can be described as one of a history of class struggle. The 
Communist Manifesto put it more vividly: "society as a whole is more and more splitting 
up into two great classes directly facing each other: bourgeoisie and proletariat" [31]. This 
picture emphasizes the long-term trend toward increasing polarization. But in shorter 
range terms, a decisive problem of each polar class is to attract and hold class allies and 
to neutralize others. Objectively classes can exist regardless of whether or not the people 
that compose these various groups are conscious of their situation. In a capitalist society, 
for example, this class struggle mainly takes place between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie which ends in the victory of the proletariat seizing the political power. 
Nicos Poulantzas in his essay [32] On Social Classes defines the Marxist concept 
of classes as "groups of several agents of men defined principally but not exclusively by 
their place in the production process, i.e., by their place in the economic sphere". This 
clearly illuminates the fact that the main basis of class analysis in Marxist Theory is the 
role played by each class in the production process. However, Poulantzas explains that 
the place of a social class in the process of production is the 'principal' determinant but 
not the 'exclusive' determinant. Ideological and political criteria also play important roles. 
Therefore, 'class' in Marxist Theory must be understood from a dynamic point of view, 
because there is always a 'process' of class formation in which classes gradually acquire 
a whole set of distinctive structural features with other classes [33]. 
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The organic unity of productive forces and the social relations of production 
constitute the economic system, also known as the mode of production. The mode of 
production is the material foundation of social life. It largely determines other aspects of 
social life, particularly the legal system, the political system and the morality. 
For our purposes the capitalist mode of production has two main features. The first 
is that the means of production are very unevenly distributed to the point that we have, for 
all practical purposes, a society divided essentially into a small group of people who 
monopolize the means of production and the rest of the population who have no means of 
production. The second feature of a capitalist mode of production is a market open to 
competition. Implicit in this feature is the emergence of a condition called 'monopoly'. 
Under the capitalist mode of production, the class of people who own and control the 
means of production are the bourgeoisie, and the class of people who do not have the 
means of production are called the proletariat. Consequently, the relationship is one of 
inherent exploitation and antagonism. Ultimately, then, classes are always power 
phenomena. The class struggle is a struggle for power between rulers and ruled, between 
oppressed and oppressing classes. Class relations, by their very nature, are asymmetrical 
relations in which those above and those below, exploiters and exploited, contend with 
each other for dominance. Man will truly come into his own, Marx contended, only when 
all class struggles which have so far characterized human history will culminate in a 
classless society in which the "strife of classes will be replaced by as ultimate harmony of 
cooperatively producing men no longer divided by divergent interests" [34]. 
Much of the above discussions conform to the social formations in advanced 
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capitalist countries. However, in most Third World states given its 'specific' historical 
evolution, the social formations differ from that of developed bourgeois states in Europe, 
North America and Japan. This 'specificity' alludes to the colonial past of many Third 
World states. This colonial experience, which introduced capitalist penetration into the 
local economies, has had a 'degenerating' impact on these societies. In an eloquent essay, 
Paul A. Baran, On the Political Economy of Backwardness, reinforces this argument. 
Baran points out that the capitalist penetration of Third World states during colonialism 
and post-colonialism reflects new social formations markedly different from those of 
advanced capitalist countries. Baran writes: 
While in advanced countries, such as France or Great Britain, the 
economically ascending middle class developed at an early stage a new 
rational world outlook, which they proudly opposed to the medieval 
obscurantism of the feudal age, the poor, the fledgling bourgeoisie of the 
underdeveloped countries sought nothing but accommodation to the 
prevailing order. Living in societies based on privilege, they strove for a 
share in the existing sinecures. They made political and economic deals 
with the domestic feudal overlords or with powerful foreign investors, and 
what industry and commerce developed in backward areas in the course of 
the last hundred years was rapidly molded in the straitjacket of monopoly — 
the plutocratic partner of the aristocratic rulers. What resulted was an 
economic and political amalgam combining the worst features of both 
worlds -- feudalism and capitalism -- and blocking effectively all 
possibilities of economic growth [35]. 
This has resulted in dynamic structures of exploiting and exploited classes. The 
historical roots of these structures can be traced to imperialist penetration of the Indian 
sub-continent by British East India Company in 1757. The British colonial government 
took over in 1813 and continued to plunder India for another two hundred and forty years. 
Bengal of which Bangladesh was an integral part provided the most revenue for British 
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colonialism. Indeed, Aniya Kumar Bagchi in his book, The Political Economy of 
Underdevelopment, writes that the exploitation of India was most severe in Bengal. 
According to Bagchi, "part of the surplus realized through the trade and revenue systems 
in Bengal was utilized to extend the British dominion over the rest of India. . ."[36]. 
European firms took over and promoted 'free trade', much to the consternation of the local 
merchants. As India's raw materials were siphoned off to Europe, a classic irony was 
taking place. From an exporter of cotton manufacturer, India became its importer from 
Britain. India was thus unable to become a leading manufacturing country. This type of 
distortion, where the economies were subordinated to the needs of metropolitan capital, 
was also taking place in Africa, as Walter Rodney has so forcefully argued in his book 
How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. However, the international bourgeoisie maintained 
its link with the indigenous bourgeoisie once colonialism exited and neo-colonialism began 
to take its shape in the newly 'independent' countries of Asia and Africa. A form of 
dependent capitalism began to emerge with distinct class formation. In post-colonial 
Bangladesh this class formation can roughly be categorized as follows; a) Bourgeoisie and 
b) Workers and Peasants: 
a) The bourgeoisie in any given capitalist society is identified with the process of 
'accumulation'. They engage in economic development to squeeze out surplus value in 
the form of profit, and then convert it to capital which they again employ in production 
for its further accumulation. This accumulation enables the bourgeoisie to exercise 
'hegemony' (the dominant ideology, namely, the concept of economic development) over 
what Gramsi calls the "'subaltern" classes within the capitalist section, e.g., the working 
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class [37]. However, economically underdeveloped countries like Bangladesh do not have 
a large bourgeoisie in this classical Marxist sense. However, Marxists including Gramsi 
consider this class at different levels and in different fractions. Nicos Poulantzas divides 
this class at two levels [38]. First, he divides the bourgeoisie into (1) industrial, (2) 
commercial, and (3) financial bourgeoisie. This differentiation makes it easier to analyze 
the bourgeoisie in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh we see the preponderance of the 
'commercial' bourgeoisie. Briefly, the commercial bourgeoisie mainly channel their 
capital into trade and commerce. As a result, the productive potential of the nation is 
seriously undermined, because the industrial muscle is weakened. 
Again, Poulantzas divides the bourgeoisie into 'comprador' and 'national' fractions 
on the basis of economic, political and ideological linkages to foreign capital. While the 
'comprador' bourgeoisie is constitutively linked to the capital of the imperialist power and 
thereby helps the exploitation of labor by foreign capital, the 'national' bourgeoisie, on the 
contrary, aims at monopolizing the process of exploitation within the country in the name 
of the nation's economic development. Consequently, the 'national' bourgeoisie can 
sometimes be at odds with imperialist designs within their countries. For example, the 
Indian 'national' bourgeoisie under Prime Ministers Nehru and Indira Gandhi successfully 
staved off foreign penetration of some key industries like steel, gas and oil. However, 
Rajiv Gandhi under IMF and World Bank pressure lifted many of the restrictions that 
discouraged foreign capital penetration into India's economy. This policy continued after 
Rajiv's assassination and presently, the Indian 'national' bourgeoisie is deeply upset with 
this 'liberalization' of the Indian economy. However, the 'comprador' bourgeoisie in 
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India has welcomed this 'bold' initiative. 
b) Workers and peasants undoubtedly form two large social classes in an 
underdeveloped agrarian economy like Bangladesh. While the industrial workers (or 
working class or proletariat in the true sense of the term) as a class are few due to the very 
low industrial base of the economy, the peasantry (including landless, poor and rich) form 
the largest class forces in Bangladesh [39], 
Betsy Hartman and James Boyce in their study, Needless Hunger: Voices From a 
Bangladesh Village, differentiate the peasantry into five basic classes based on their 
relationship to the land because the "dichotomy between ownership of land and labor on 
it" is widespread [40]. Indeed, several empirical exercises confirm the findings of 
Hartman and Boyce. For example, Table 2.2 entirely supports the suggestion that 
disparity in land ownership is 'widespread1. 
Table 2.2 
The Pattern of Distribution of Land Ownership. 977 to 1979 
Land Ownership Groups 
(Acres) 
Percentage of Households Percentage of Land Owned 
1977 1978 1979 1977 1978 1979 
Up to 1.0 55.5 59.4 60.5 9.3 8.3 8.8 
1.01-2.0 16.4 15.2 15.1 14.4 12.8 13.4 
2.01-5.0 17.5 16.9 16.8 33.3 30.5 32.0 
5.01 - 10.0 5.7 5.8 5.5 33.3 22.9 23.2 
10.01 & above 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 100.0 
Source: M. Hossain, "A Note on the Trend o 
1985,2. 
Landlessness in Bangladesh", BIDS, 
According to this survey, the bottom seventy-five percent of the households owned 
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only about a fifth of the total land, while the top 8.5 percent, who owned land in sizes 
more than 5 acres, owned 48 percent of the total land (1978 estimate). Total land owned 
in 1978 was 20.8 million acres. 
Therefore, the disparity in land ownership shown in Table 2.2 manifests in, 
according to Hartman and Boyce, five basic classes in rural Bangladesh. These are: 1) 
The Landlords, 2) Rich Peasants, 3) Middle Peasants, 4) Poor Peasants and 5) Landless 
Peasants. 
1) The landlords do not work on the land themselves, except sometimes to supervise 
the poor peasants (agrarian proletariat). Instead, they hire wage labor or let out land to 
sharecroppers. They have important social, political and economic ties with the ruling 
class and help to perpetuate the dominant ideology in the villages. Indeed, the military 
government since 1975 has specifically targeted this class and the rich peasants to provide 
a political 'base' for the armed forces. This endeavor involved dispensing agricultural 
machinery at low cost, fertilizer, government loans and subsidies and a host of other 
incentives to be discussed in the next chapter. 
2) This class of peasants work in the fields, but have more land than they can cultivate 
alone. They gain most of their income from lands they cultivate with hired labor or 
sharecroppers. In some villages of Bangladesh, the rich peasants or landlords often take 
two-thirds of the harvest. Often the sharecropper has to buy the seed and fertilizer in 
which case his share of the harvest is further compromised. This type of 'free' labor 
accentuates rural proletarization. In 1977, the average daily wage in rural Bangladesh was 
Taka 4.50; this amount could buy 1.201b of rice in the market as compared to 1.60 lbs in 
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1951 [41], when the wages were calculated at Taka 0.50. Clearly, the real wages of the 
rural proletariat had hardly changed his purchasing power over a period of twenty-six 
years. Indeed, we see a downward trend in his economic condition. 
3) The middle peasants are the self-sufficient small farmers. They earn their living 
mainly by working their own land, though at times they may work for others or hire others 
to work for them. 
4) The poor peasants own a little land, but not enough to support themselves. They 
earn their living mainly by working as sharecroppers or wage laborers. This class is also 
known as 'functionally' landless [42]. In recent years, a significant number of poor 
peasants have migrated to the cities in search of 'better' opportunities. 
5) The landless peasants own no land and live in accommodationsprovided by rich and 
middle class peasants during harvest time. In other months, the landless peasants engage 
in subsidiary professions like selling vegetables, kerosene oil, salt, and cigarettes. For 
those unable to engage in petty trading for lack of capital, asking for alms is an alternative. 
In 1977, 4.54 million of Bangladesh's population were rural proletariat (landless peasants) 
[43]. These peasants are most vulnerable and are continuously exploited by rich peasants, 
money lenders and landlords. As a result, these peasants are in perpetual financial debt. 
The petit-bourgeoisie as a distinct class has evoked intense debate in Marxist class 
analysis. According to Hal Draper: 
Strictly speaking, the petit-bourgeoisie comprises those who make their 
living primarily by the exercise of their own labor with their self-owned 
means of production (tools) or other property (like a shop) [44]. 
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Issa Shivji in an analysis of class structure in Tanzania also included among the 
petit-bourgeoisie such people as intellectuals, civil servants and teachers [45]. 
Nicos Poulantzas's characterization of the petit-bourgeoisie [46] when applied to 
Bangladesh's class formation will help us place the armed forces squarely in this category. 
According to Poulantzas, the petit-bourgeoisie is the 'non-productive wage earning 
class' and, therefore, is not engaged in producing surplus value like the rural proletariat 
and the industrial proletariat as elucidated earlier. The Bangladesh armed forces and the 
civil servants (two important actors in our analysis) by being 'non-productive' in the 
economic realm are members of the petit-bourgeoisie. Theoretically, the relationship of 
the armed forces and the civil servants with other social classes should be non-antagonistic 
because none of them exclusively depend on the employment of wage labor and, therefore, 
cannot be considered as exploiters. However, this paper will show that the petit- 
bourgeoisie indirectly exploits the masses by perpetuating class rule in Bangladesh. By 
aligning with the rich peasants and the 'comprador' bourgeoisie, the Bangladesh armed 
forces and the civil servants accentuate the 'marginalization' of the country's poor and 
impoverished. This will be made more clear when we consider their respective roles in 
the course of analyzing the role of the state in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER HI 
THE ARMED FORCES AND THE STATE IN BANGLADESH 
In the previous essay we were able to delineate the class forces in Bangladesh and 
to identify and situate the armed forces in these social formations. In this chapter, an 
attempt will be made to describe and analyze the consequential manifestations of these 
class formations, which are reflected in the economic, political and social policies of the 
state [1]. In particular, the focus will be on the military's alliance with the 'comprador' 
and 'rural' bourgeoisie in perpetuating a degenerating impact on the nation's economy. 
Indeed, since the military coup in 1975 which enabled the Bangladesh armed forces to 
capture state power, economic development has contributed little to eradicate poverty and, 
therefore, alleviate the miserable conditions of the majority of its population. On the 
contrary, the pattern of dependent development prescribed by the donors and other 
capitalist financial institutions, and followed religiously by Bangladesh's military leaders, 
has accentuated concentrations in the ownership of wealth and inequality in the distribution 
of income without leading to significant expansion of the productive forces within the 
economy. Aid dependence has in fact been self-perpetuating, as it has, over the years, 
served to reinforce a system which has been inimical to the mobilization of domestic 
resources and the effective use of productive capacities [2], 
Therefore, a clear alliance of class forces with the representing peasantry (the moral 
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bourgeoisie), the Bangladesh military (the petit-bourgeoisie), and the commercial traders 
(comprador bourgeoisie) who benefit from these aid dispensation has been established. 
However, understanding why this cohesion or alliance has prevailed since the military 
coup must of necessity involve an analysis of the nature of the state in Bangladesh. 
Hamza Alavi's essay [3] on the post-colonial state provides a good starting point 
to analyze the nature of the state in Bangladesh. Briefly, Alavi's formulation identifies 
three defining characteristics of an 'overdeveloped state'. The first characteristic is that 
the post-colonial state inherits from the metropolitan bourgeoisie a "powerful bureaucratic- 
military apparatus", which was "overdeveloped" in relation to the colonized society, 
because of the necessity to subordinate the latter to colonial interests. The second involves 
"a new relatively autonomous economic role", by which the state appropriates a large part 
of the economic surplus and uses it in bureaucratically directed activity in the name of 
development. Finally, the state plays a crucial role in creating territorial unity and 
legitimacy. For our purpose, the proposition of the "relative autonomy" of the post¬ 
colonial state requires amplification. 
For Alavi, the post-colonial state "is not the instrument of a single class. 
It is relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of the 
three propertied classes -- the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the indigenous 
bourgeoisie, and the landed classes - while at the same time acting on 
behalf of all of them in order to preserve the social order in which their 
interests are embedded, namely, the institution of private property and the 
capitalist mode as the dominant mode of production." [4]. 
The political parties may sometimes challenge the relative autonomy and the 
mediatory role of the bureaucratic military oligarchy, but, as Alavi points out, the political 
parties often play complementary roles. Alavi's formation is not without detractors. For 
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example, several authors, including John Saul [5], suggest that the two indigenous classes 
to which Alavi refers-"the landed classes" and the "indigenous bourgeoisie"~are very 
much less prominent in post-colonial states of East Africa because of the 'nature' of pre¬ 
colonial African society. Saul continues, "Nor has the indigenous bourgeoisie developed 
even to the degree described by Alavi for Pakistan and Bangladesh" [6]. Empirical 
evidence available, however, negates Alavi's contention in so far as Bangladesh is 
concerned. In Bangladesh, the "bourgeoisie" is concerned in an extremely embryonic state 
and is rather small to play any important role in capital accumulation. As we shall see, 
the Bangladeshi bourgeoisie has been victimized by a long history of 'internal' colonization 
(experience much like the blacks in the United States and South Africa) under Pakistan. 
This history denied Bangladeshis' access to capital, land ownership and representation in 
military and civil bureaucracy. The point to understand here is, why there exists in a 
population of one hundred and ten million a capitalist class of only a few thousand. This 
issue is fundamental to understanding the negligible role of the bourgeoisie in Bangladesh's 
political economy. Aid dependence has critically undermined the bourgeoisie's ability to 
generate growth. This point has been succinctly made by Rehman Sobhan [7]: 
Aid has been a critical source for both capacity creation and utilization in 
the manufacturing sector. Virtually every new industrial project under 
execution in the public or private sector is tied to aid disbursements either 
directly to the project or through various public sector financing agencies. 
This dependence on aid has made investment priorities and the choice of 
technology in manufacturing highly sensitive to the sources of aid and the 
terms and pace at which it is disbursed. Bangladesh has done little to build 
up a capacity for a self-generating industrialization program. Since much 
of the aid is for import substituting projects, without necessarily building 
a capital goods sector to sustain a self-reliant program of industrialization, 
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aid is enhancing rather than reducing external dependence in this sector. 
Since the first military coup in 1975, the World Bank has emerged as the most 
vocal spokesman of Bangladesh's development strategy. As the coordinator of the 
Bangladesh Aid Consortium, it not only prepares the annual report on the state of the 
Bangladesh economy, but puts together a considerable body of documentation on particular 
aspects of the economy and development process. Since all such studies are influenced by 
the particular ideological biases of the Bank, donor's intelligence on the Bangladesh 
economy tends to be largely influenced by the same perspectives as that of the Bank[8]. 
The Bank's dominant position in influencing the praetorian state's economic policies is 
noted in Just Faaland's important case study of the Bangladesh aid group prepared in 1981: 
The role of the World Bank as determined organizer of credits, not 
primarily an international instrument of mediation, was seen as being 
exposed beyond doubt [9]. 
Indeed, World Bank 'Commodity Aid', and program loans are simply to support 
and strengthen the recipient government, and in Bangladesh's case this reflects a military 
government intimately allied with the rural and comprador bourgeoisie. So, while gently 
deploring the subversion of its good intentions by the ruling class and the lack of 
government interest in rural reform, the World Bank is one of the most important forces 
ensuring the survival of the praetorian state and the members of the ruling class. 
Therefore, Poulantzas had correctly summarized that this material link binds the local 
comprador bourgeoisie both ideologically and politically to external capital's interest in 
contrast to the local interest [10]. 
Continuing our discussion of Alavi, this time pertaining to his notion of the state 
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of Bangladesh as being 'overdeveloped', I would like to argue, based on empirical 
evidence (Table 3.1), that the state is far from being 'overdeveloped' to the degree Alavi 
describes viz-a-viz Bangladesh. This necessitates a brief discussion of Bangladesh's 
experience as an "internal" colony under Pakistan. 
Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) was one of two wings of Pakistan (the other 
being West Pakistan) separated by 1000 miles of Indian territory. When the British 
colonial government quit India, the state of Pakistan was bom along religious lines in 
1947. Predominantly Muslim, the two wings of Pakistan had little else in common. As 
Feroz Ahmed put it: 
Ever since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has been a geographical absurdity, 
with its two part separated by one thousand miles of unfriendly Indian 
territory. Greater than the spatial distance is the difference in the social 
structure, economy and culture. Adherence to a common religion, Islam, 
was never sufficient to make these two dissimilar parts a single nation. But 
for almost twenty-four years, Pakistan weathered all storms and maintained 
a precarious unity. That unity was finally broken in March 1971 when the 
West Pakistani military launched an all-out war to suppress the movement 
for regional autonomy in East Pakistan, forcing the region to declare itself 
an independent People's Republic of Bangladesh [11]. 
However, the most disturbing aspect of this absurdity was East Pakistan's status 
as an internal colony of West Pakistan which manifested in almost zero growth for East 
Pakistan's infrastructure. Since 1947, East Pakistan became the supplier of raw materials 
to the industries located in the United Kingdom and West Pakistan. As a result, the 
foreign exchange earnings from indigenous exports like jute and tea were diverted to West 
Pakistan to finance the 'decade of development' much heralded by Harvard economists in 
the 1960s. Also, the aid that poured into Pakistan during the twenty-four years hardly 
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trickled down to the masses in East Pakistan. Moreover, all the major industries in East 
Pakistan, including jute and tea, were owned by West Pakistani capitalists. Policies 
imposed in order to guarantee cheap raw materials for the factories resulted in the 
exploitation and increased impoverishment of Bangladeshi peasants. Such policies were 
adopted and enforced on behalf of the West Pakistani capitalists by the military-civil 
bureaucracy, which was also largely West Pakistani as Table 3.1 clearly shows: 
Table 3.1 
Differences in Sectoral Allocations in Pakistan 
(1960 Figures) 
East Pakistan West Pakistan 
(Now Bangladesh) (Now Pakistan) 
(i) Five Year Allocations 
(a) First 32% 68% 
(b) Second 32% 68% 
(c) Third 36% 64% 
(ii) Foreign Aid Allocation 
20-30% 70-80% 
(iii) Civil Service Jobs 
16-20% 80-84% 
(iv) Military Jobs 
10% 90% 
(v) Percentage of Total Population 
55% 45% 
Source: Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive: The Death of a State. (Penguin Books, 
London, 1983) 86. 
The disparity becomes more pronounced once we examine in Table 3.2, the relative 
values of exports of one region to the other, with West Pakistan consistently having a 
favorable balance of trade: 
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Table 3.2 
Interregional Trade Exports 
(Millions in Rupees) 
Year East Pakistan West Pakistan 
1948-49 18.8 137.6 
1950-51 46.0 210.8 
1955-56 220.7 318.9 
1960-61 355.9 800.5 
1965-66 649.7 1,189.8 
1969-70 915.7 1,656.2 
Source: Feroz Ahmed, Structural Matrix of the Struggle in Bangladesh in Imperialism anc 
Revolution in South Asia. (New York: MRP, 1973) 425. 
Thus, the penetration of West Pakistan-based capital and the siphoning off of East 
Pakistan's raw materials in a classical colonial situation-use of the colony as a market for 
the mother country's manufacturer-clearly arrested the growth of the economy in East 
Pakistan, and hence stunted the class structure, as was discussed in our analysis of social 
class formation in Bangladesh. Racism, too, was used as a tool by West Pakistan's power 
elite to discourage meaningful participation by Bengalis in almost all areas of states 
activities, particularly in defense allocation and representation in civil bureaucracy [12]. 
Despite representing the majority of Pakistan's population, not a single East Pakistani ever 
governed Pakistan. Historically, therefore, this economic and racial subjugation of East 
Pakistan condemned the population to a perpetual inferior economic position. This inferior 
status was constantly regenerated not only by economic dynamics, but also by the legal, 
cultural, political, and social apparatuses controlled by West Pakistan's capitalist class. 
This large scale economic disparity between the two wings of Pakistan brought 
about by the persistent neo-colonial exploitation and domination could be summed up as 
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class transfers of surpluses from the peasants of the East to capitalists of the West. 
Consequently, the birth of Bangladesh witnessed the complete severance of 
relations between the two wings, and created a vacuum in all areas of economic activity, 
and the structural weaknesses in the national economy were compounded by the weakness 
of its bourgeoisie. This meant that not only was it necessary to find new sources of supply 
and markets, but new classes, institutions, and skills had to be developed to replace the 
West Pakistani bourgeoisie in Bangladesh. The military and civil bureaucracy was also 
small and insignificant for these to become effective actors in the new state. Moreover, 
a significant number of armed personnel had died in the Civil War of 1971. Therefore, 
I would argue that Alavi ignores the disruptive effect of this decisive break with the past, 
and seems to analyze the concept of the state in Bangladesh as being 'overdeveloped' by 
simply assuming a direct substitution of resources, sources of supply and social forces 
from West to East Pakistan. When Bangladesh was bom, the civilians were in charge and 
the military-civil bureaucracy had little influence on the state for it to be described as 
'overdeveloped'. The new government wary of military institutions (most of the leaders 
including Sheikh Mujib, the leader of the Awami League, were imprisoned for a prolonged 
period under Pakistani military governments) decided to maintain a low profile for the new 
Bangladesh armed forces. 
My attempt here has not been, however, designed to refute all of Alavi's argument, 
but rather to present a critique in the areas where I feel his analysis is inadequate viz-a-viz 
the post-colonial state in Bangladesh. 
Besides the comprador bourgeoisie which has benefited under state patronage 
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dispensed by the military rulers in Bangladesh, the rural bourgeoisie or the rich peasants 
have also substantially improved their circumstances under state patronage. This alliance 
reinforces Alavi's thesis that there exists a "relative autonomy" of the state, despite the 
relative weaknesses of Bangladesh's indigenous bourgeoisie pointed out by John Saul. The 
state engages in these dispensations for two reasons: First, to promote economic 
development in the rural areas, which in the long run would protect the interests of the 
rural bourgeoisie, and by extension the interests of the military-bureaucratic 'oligarchy'. 
Second, state patronage is intended to build a political base for the ruling civil-military 
coalition in the rural areas. This will be made more clear when we discuss the specific 
policies that were introduced by the praetorian state. 
Atiur Rahman's study reveals some glaring empirical evidence of the military 
government's attempt to promote dependent capitalism in rural Bangladesh. Central to 
Rahman's analysis is the absence of an indigenous bourgeoisie in Bangladesh for reasons 
which have been discussed earlier. 
The military bureaucracy has become the dominant faction of the ruling class. In this 
capacity, the military bureaucracy ever mindful of the influence of the rulers has made 
them a junior partner in the ruling coalition. 
Rahman argues that the petit-bourgeois elements who led the struggle against 
Pakistan were not competent enough to dominate the 'overdeveloped' state inherited from 
Pakistan-the metropolitan power. 
As a result, "those at the top of the bureaucratic military apparatus of the state have 
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been able to maintain and even extend their dominant power in the Society" [13]. 
This extension of 'hegemony' in the rural areas by the military governments of Zia 
and Ershad involved disbursing 76.7% of total foreign aid for the rural bourgeoisie [14]. 
The government relies on foreign aid for four-fifths of its development budget. Therefore, 
donors are able to exert on the military regimes considerable political influence. Various 
incentives by the state, represented by the armed forces since 1975, have played a pivotal 
role in expanding the economic power of the rural bourgeoisie. Significant among these 
incentives are subsidies for agricultural inputs, improving irrigation facilities and imposing 
light taxation on landowners. The state's monopoly on aid dispensation also allows the 
military government to procure fertilizer at subsidized rates for the rural bourgeoisie. To 
facilitate the expansion of rice cultivation, the state has been quite generous in distributing 
institutional credit to the rural bourgeoisie. In fact, the amount of institutional credit to 
the 'kulaks' jumped from the equivalent value of US$1.9 million to the coup to US $10 
million within three years after the 1975 military coup [15]. 
The above figures reflect a growing understanding on the part of the armed forces 
of the need to cultivate the rural bourgeoisie, and to this end its bureaucracy is involved 
in disseminating the required institutions in rural Bangladesh. For example, a large 
number of banks (both government and private) have mushroomed in the villages. The 
state has reoriented its executive branches and a huge number of its administrative staff are 
now directly involved in rural 'embourgeoisment*. 
To ensure proper dispensation of the state's patronage system, the military 
governments of Zia and Ershad formed 'village governments' composed mostly of rural 
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elites [16]. A brief discussion of these rural governments are necessary to show how the 
Generals' attempted to gain legitimacy both at the national and local levels. Specifically, 
the discussion will show that these attempts at strengthening the political and economic 
power of the rural bourgeoisie failed to sustain Zia in power and have now (under General 
Ershad), albeit, in a new restructuring of the same institutions, become agencies for 
massive rural exploitation, patronage and repression. These rural governments within the 
state of Bangladesh operated in 68,000 villages. Our analysis of various literature focused 
on 'Gram Sarkar' clearly shows that these institutions have failed to bring about qualitative 
change in the lives of rural masses. On the contrary, the state has dispensed considerable 
autonomy to these village governments to suppress peasant demands, ignore exploitation 
of peasants and introduce forced sterilization to conform to population quota prescribed 
by the World Bank. 
General Zia introduced 'Gram Sarkar' in 1980. The primary functions of 'Gram 
Sarkar' were to take care of local problems pertaining to land disputes, land reform-the 
fundamental demand of Bangladesh's peasantry, maintain law and order, control 
population growth, and double food production through a self-reliant economy. By 1980, 
6,800 (1 for 1000 villages) 'Gram Sarkar' had been organized. These village governments 
conducted business under the direct supervision of state bureaucrats appointed by the 
military regime to oversee the activities of the member who were chose through consensus 
among all eligible voters of the village. Herein lies the problem of 'Gram Sarkar', 
because consensus reflected representation by rural elite whose fortunes were intimately 
tied to state patronage. Poor peasants, therefore, were apprehensive of these village 
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governments, because they lacked the economic and social resources to effect change. As 
Marcus Franda observes: 
Most of the Gram Sarkars have been chosen by a consensus evolved at 
village meetings, with the nature of that consensus being determined by 
Thana Circle officers representing the central government. . . observers 
who have watched the selection process in several villages suggest that 
members of parliament and district officers frequently play a major role in 
choosing these consensual candidates [17]. 
Because of their domination in the administration of 'Gram Sarkar', the rich 
peasants also became the local trading dealers (licensed by the state) in agricultural imports 
like pesticide, fertilizer, rice and flour, and earned exorbitant profits through selling these 
essential agricultural imports and consumption goods in the black market. This patronage 
has also allowed the rich peasants to own more land thereby multiplying the instances of 
landlessness in rural Bangladesh [18]. Therefore, village governments established by Zia 
and Ershad conform to Gramscian framework of accumulation where the state confines 
itself to the task of creating an atmosphere most conducive to the process of capitalist 
growth. This includes the creation of infrastructural facilities through public investment. 
[19]. 
In essence, 'Gram Sarkar' was General Zia's attempt to spread the influence of his 
political party, the BNP. The mere fact that members of Gram Sarkar were chosen by 
members of Parliament who belonged to BNP and state elements controlled by the BNP 
questions the credibility of such institutions. 
When General Ershad assumed the powers of the state in a military coup in 1982 
following a brief civilian administration that followed Zia's assassination, 'Gram Sarkar' 
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became history and emerged under Ershad with a new name, "Upazilla Parishad". The 
fundamental difference is that the members of this village government would be "elected" 
and not "selected" as was the case under General Zia. 
Ershad, like Zia, promised land-reform to alleviate the marginilization of the rural 
poor under the programs of "Upazilla Parishad". Up until now the existing landownership 
laws are in place and the cursory attempt to even consider land reform has been met with 
hostile reaction from the rural bourgeoisie. The 'elections' for Upazilla Parishad are 
marked by deadly violence all over rural Bangladesh. 
Of course, it would have been surprising if the state had even seriously considered 
attempting land reform that would fundamentally alter the precarious conditions of the 
rural masses. The structural limitations and class-based developmental policies of the state 
would not permit this. This paradox is well argued in the following passage by Hossain 
and Jones in Rural Development and the State : 
That the existing inadequate land reform legislation has not been 
implemented and that agrarian reform has not enjoyed a higher place on the 
developmental agenda over the past thirty years is hardly surprising, given 
the nature of the state in Bangladesh. 
National politicians and bureaucrats are often themselves large landowners 
and even if they are not, they depend on rich peasants both for political 
support and to ensure that the countryside remains reasonably tranquil. To 
attack the interests of this dominant class would be political suicide for any 
of the main political parties [20]. 
Therefore, the discussion has shown how state resources and patronage are used 
by the military government as instruments to reward the rich peasantry in exchange for 
economic and political support, which in turn keep the rural poor in bondage to the rich 
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peasants. If the state continues to follow this pattern of development, .we have the 
warnings implicit in the first five year plan of the consequences of such social formation. 
The plan categorically states: 
It is well known that serious class differences exist in rural society of 
Bangladesh. The rural power structure is authoritarian, dominated by the 
vested groups. If these groups continue to dominate and make decisions 
regarding the choice of new technology and institutions, the interests of the 
lower stratum will not be safeguarded. Class differences may be magnified 
and bitter class struggle will be inevitable [21]. 
In the final analysis, the donors must also accept responsibility in perpetuating this 
uneven development in Bangladesh. Clearly, aid is dispensed to maintain the praetorian 
state and thereby reinforce the trading links established with foreign governments and their 
private investors in Bangladesh. 
To offset the growing power of rural bourgeoisie influencing rural credits are 
banking alternative organizational efforts, albeit in modest form, are taking shape in the 
villages of Bangladesh. Prominent among these is the emergence of the Grameen Bank 
whose purpose is to provide financial assistance, particularly to women and rural poor, to 
enable them to earn a steady subsistence income. 
The Grameen Bank is based on community relations as opposed to market relations 
in the domain of capital. Borrowers are observed for their loan utilization and repayment 
behavior. A loan is made out to a group; if a member of the group fails to repay a 
percentage of the loan then the entire group is penalized. This brings peer pressure to bear 
on the initial borrowers for good performance [22], The most striking aspect of this 
project is that many commercial banks--with the state as a mediator are engaged in this 
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type of rural credit programs. Moreover, the project requires substantial financial 
assistance from international monetary institutions and governments that otherwise 
propagate the ideology of capital [23]. 
Summarizing, we can deduce from our discussion thus far that the present state in 
Bangladesh is an instrument of the ruling class, which has allowed the military to articulate 
its interests in the realm of politics and economics. It is apparent from our discussion that 
the state looms large in the totality of institutions in Bangladesh. The military, the petit- 
bourgeoisie class in active connivance with the comprador and rural bourgeoisie, can be 
identified as a ruling coalition, set apart to rule others by maintaining a class society 
fundamentally geared toward exploiting Bangladesh's impoverished millions. Too many 
critics and opponents have been killed, harassed and imprisoned for us to fail to appreciate 
that the state is not simply a theoretical construct; it is a defacto internal force, an 
established machine governed by rules and discipline with powerful capacity for coercion 
and control, a disturbing trend to which is addressed in Chapter V. 
Therefore, Poulantzas rightly treats the state as a general articulating principle and 
considers it as 'the factor of cohesion of a social formation and the factor of reproduction 
of a system that itself determines the domination of one class over the others' [24]. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF THE BANGLADESH ARMED FORCES IN THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 
In the previous chapters the central concern of the paper was the nature of the state 
and social formation which developed following the military coup in August 1975. This 
chapter seeks to focus on the evolution of the armed forces as a political actor determined 
to maintain rather than destroy the class configuration of Bangladesh society. This, of 
course, was made possible as our earlier discussion has clearly shown, by the strong 
support of the rural bourgeoisie, the comprador bourgeoisie and the civil bureaucracy. 
Historically, military coups have occurred to strengthen the bourgeois social 
relationships when these relationships are threatened by other social forces as in Chile 
under Allende. The coup in 1973 which overthrew the elected government of President 
Salvador Allende was initiated chiefly to destroy Allende's brand of Chilean democracy 
committed to an egalitarian society. General Augusto Pinochet, who became the head of 
the state after leading the troops against the President set out violently to destroy Allende's 
political vision. Aided by a group of technocrats known as the Chicago boys, Pinochet, 
advocated a "truly" open society where enterprise could flourish unbridled and where 
individual opportunity would undermine the "foreign” socialist doctrines of Chile's 
political class. The new junta argued that economic progress under a consumer-oriented 
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free market economy would render obsolete the traditional political loyalties of the Chilean 
people [1]. The technocrats argued that authoritarianism was required to prevent the 
spread of 'socialist' programs. Impervious to protests of affected groups and individuals 
and conscientious voices from outside, the junta made full use of its monopoly of coercive 
power to implement its new programs. In the process many died and democratic 
institutions, the media, colleges and universities, the judicial system and labor unions 
became targets of massive repression. Indeed, Guillermo O'Donnel, an authority on Latin 
American military history, forcefully argues that the army's advent into Latin American 
politics is essentially an attempt to create a "bureaucratic authoritarian" state to circumvent 
working class mobilization and, therefore, prevent the spread of a revolutionary culture. 
O'Donnel further argues that central to their intervention is an attempt to dépoliticize the 
masses and to exclude the masses from any meaningful political and economic 
participation. 
However, there are cases of military coups that were staged to install 
'revolutionary' military regimes committed to principles of socialism. For example, 
Kerekou's coup in Bénin in 1972 announced following a period of internal deliberations 
that Benin would adopt Marxism as its nationalist ideology and that a political party would 
be formed to act as "the vanguard of the proletariat" [3]. 
Another example of a military coup that would fundamentally restructure society 
along socialist lines was the February 1974 coup in Ethiopia. The entire society was 
mobilized to eradicate pre-capitalist relations of productions and introduce a mode of 
production that was essentially Marxist in orientation. The leadership of the mass 
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upheaval was provided mostly by student leaders aided by local left wing intellectuals. 
Land reform became the paramount consideration of the new regime which is 
understandable given that 2% of the landed aristocracy owned 80 percent of agricultural 
land [4]. 
Such revolutions from above are problematic. Most Third World armed forces are 
plagued by internal dissents, lack of revolutionary consciousness and a host of other 
problems that seriously undermine the potential for a mass based revolutionary upsurge. 
Implicit in this argument is the need to educate the masses through grassroots activism, 
rather than trying to win them over through the use of force and coercion. And for this 
method to be effective, "revolutionary" political parties rather than "radical" military 
regimes can only act as the springboard to fundamental restructuring of society. In 
Bangladesh, as we shall see, a segment of the armed forces attempted to initiate a military 
coup that would represent the interests of peasants and the working class. However, in the 
absence of any grassroots level contact with these class forces and the revolutionary 
parties, the coup failed, with disastrous consequences for the entire progressive movement 
in Bangladesh. 
For our purposes, we shall maintain that the August 1975 coup in Bangladesh was 
orchestrated to maintain capitalist relations of productions when these relations were 
seriously challenged by revolutionary forces in the country. For the argument to have any 
validity, it is necessary to delve into the character of the social, political and economic 
relationships brought about by the Awami League following the end of the bloody civil 
war in 1971 that witnessed the disintegration of Pakistan and the birth of Bangladesh. 
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Such an analysis will shed some light on the evolution of the Bangladesh armed forces as 
a political actor. Also, we will discuss the role played by the left-wing political parties in 
organizing the peasants and workers with a view to making them an assertive class force 
capable of seizing political power in Bangladesh. In the course of our discussion, it will 
become clear that the armed forces and the revolutionary parties, deeply dissatisfied with 
the political objectives of the Awami League, were competing with each other to capture 
state power. Yet their motives were at the opposite ends of the political spectrum. 
Talukdar Maniruzzam has correctly labelled the civil war in Bangladesh an 
'unfinished revolution', because despite Awami Leagues promises of establishing socialism 
in independent Bangladesh property relationships remained unaltered [5]. Socialism of the 
Awami League was more rhetoric than practical. This becomes more evident when the 
economic objectives of the Awami League government are stated by the planning 
commission set up in 1972 to address the development strategy for Bangladesh. According 
to the planning commission: 
The removal of the capitalist system of income distribution, of the private 
ownership of the means of production and of the capitalist mercantile or 
feudal forms of production relations is a necessary pre-condition to social 
transformation. . . .[6]. 
Since independence and up until the Awami League's fall in 1975, Bangladesh had 
received a massive influx of foreign aid-over 500 million U.S. dollars per year. Yet the 
country's agriculture and industry continued to stagnate and the living conditions of the 
masses steadily deteriorated. 
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All major industries were nationalized to restructure "property relations by placing the 
means of production under the ownership of the people" [7], 
Notwithstanding the stated objectives of the Awami League government, rich 
kulaks and money lenders flourished under the Awami League, and the dichotomy between 
ownership of land and labor became more pervasive. Government institutions created to 
oversee nationalized industries like jute, textile and tea became extremely corrupt and 
inefficient. To make matters worse, a famine in 1974 brought about horrendous problems 
for the government. The New York Times on 15 December 1974, reported that 15 million 
peasants lost their homes and at least 2,000 people died of hunger in the month of August 
alone. 
However, a Bangladeshi scholar, Rehman Sobhan, categorically blames the United 
States for the famine in 1974. Sobhan argues that the famine could have been averted had 
it not been for the policy of the United States to withhold food shipments to Bangladesh 
in 1974. The United States at the time pressured the Awami League government to cease 
all relations with Cuba. In Rehman's words: "the time involved in the resolving of this 
crisis, which culminated in an enforced suspension of exports by Bangladesh to Cuba was 
crucial in affecting the level of food imports" [8]. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's pro-Moscow 
position at the time lends credence to Rehman Sobhan's explanation of the 1974 famine. 
In the same breath it can be argued that the military officers who organized the coup 
against Mujib in 1975 perhaps recognized Mujib's vulnerability during the famine (Mujib 
under pressure from the Ford administration cut off all ties with Cuba) and decided to 
mobilize support for a military take-over. 
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General Zia's attempts to appease the United States following the coup make this argument 
plausible. 
Another reason for the chaos in the country was the AL's failure to deal with the 
war criminals in an appropriate fashion. For reasons still not clear the AL government had 
decided not to set up a war tribunal to punish those responsible for the 'genocide' in 1971, 
including Bangladeshis who had collaborated with Pakistan. 
Many in Bangladesh assumed that this compassion on Mujib's part was in reality 
pressure exerted by India (its powerful neighbor and ally during the war of independence) 
ostensibly to protect the prisoners of war, especially Pakistan's top military officers, who 
might have attended the same military academy or were originally from the same village 
as those of top Indian military officers who had played a pivotal role in Bangladesh's 
liberation struggle. However, the compassion shown towards Bangladeshi collaborators 
proved costly for the Awami League following the military coup. Many were rehabilitated 
in the civil bureaucracy and were placed in powerful positions by General Zia [9]. The 
political elements who opposed the creation of Bangladesh and prepared the 'list' for the 
massacre of Bengali intellectuals were allowed to resurface and are now a formidable 
political force in the country [10]. Many Bangladeshi viewed this initiative by General Zia 
(himself a freedom fighter) as an insult to the spirit of the liberation struggle. Two reasons 
can be adduced for the rehabilitation of the Islamic fundamentalists. First, the 
rehabilitation of the fundamentalists can be argued as a politically astute move for Zia, 
since his military regime was heavily dependent on aid from the Islamic 'bloc' especially 
Saudi Arabia. In fact, Saudi Arabia recognized Bangladesh as a sovereign nation only 
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after the August coup. Second, Zia desperate for international aid contingent upon the 
establishment, or at least a semblance of 'democracy', took a number of steps to legitimize 
his regime. These included elections and since there was no effective opposition against 
him, as the AL, the major political force in the country, was operating in exile, the Jamat- 
e-Islam party, along with a number of other non-descript political parties, provided the 
needed opposition for Zia. The steps taken by Zia, which also included the formation of 
a political party--the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the creation of new village 
institutions-the Gram Sarkar, boded well for Zia as foreign aid transformed him from a 
"soldier" into a "politician" [11]. Zia used the foreign aid to maintain a decent standard 
of living for his soldiers, and indulged them primarily to ensure loyalty of the armed 
forces and offset the potential for a military coup against him. The defense budget left 
over from the Mujib regime for 1975-1976 was immediately revised upwards, with the 
original allocation raised from 7% of the national budget to 20% of the national budget 
[12]. Today it stands at 30% of the national budget under General Ershad. A closer look 
at Table 4.1, which details military expenditures before 1975 and after the military coup 
(1976 and onwards), will clearly show the stupendous growth which was made possible 
by the injection of foreign aid into Zia and Ershad's regime. 
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Table 4.1 
Military Expenditures, Armed Forces, GNP and Population 








GNP Per Capita 
(Constant 1984 
Dollars) 
1975 42 100 76.2 123 
1976 94 126 77.9 135 
1977 145 126 80.4 132 
1978 155 129 82.9 137 
1979 125 120 85.5 139 
1980 141 71 88.1 137 
1981 170 77 90.7 142 
1982 206 77 93.3 138 
1983 278 81 95.9 139 
1984 265 91 98.7 142 
1985 253 91 101.4 143 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers. 1987. U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, 50. 
These military expenditures were essential to the survival of the generals. Included 
in these expenditures were the import of sophisticated weapons to fight the autonomy 
movement in southeastern Bangladesh, construction of luxury apartments for military 
officers, transportation, pay raises, construction of sports facilities for soldiers and a 
number of other perks, without comparable benefits for their civilian counterparts. These 
expenditures can easily be put to better use in the civilian sector where 500,000 children 
are blinded every year from Vitamin A deficiency, and periodic localized famines. Not 
surprisingly, agriculture also suffers from a lack of funds since the armed forces gobble 
up a huge chunk of the national budget. 
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In fact, the main development which has taken place in Bangladesh since the 
military coup is the development of the military elite. Bangladesh's most pressing 
employment problem is providing work for the millions of landless rural people, but 
empirical evidence suggests that the only sector which has been booming in terms of 
employment is public administration, in which military officers have a strong edge over 
civilian bureaucrats. These officers are placed in important government positions, 
ambassadorships and government ministers. While real wages of landless peasants are 
plummeting, the government continues to increase the salaries and perks for military 
officers. 
General Ershad who assumed power in a bloodless military coup in 1982, also had 
the interests of the armed forces as paramount. Indeed, he has remained in power 
primarily by keeping the armed forces satisfied. New pay scales enforced in August 1985 
brought about parity of salaries between civilian and military employees. However, 
defense personnel receive additional allowances and benefits. For officers, these include: 
service allowances amounting to 12.5 percent of their original pay; free medical treatment; 
servant allowances; and food rations at nominal prices, all of which amount to at least the 
monthly salary of the highest-ranking civil servant. The benefits enjoyed by lower ranks 
are proportionally even larger. They receive service allowances amounting to 20 percent 
of their original pay, free food and accommodation, and allowances for 'good' conduct, 
efficiency and their children's education. Thus, privates and NCO's get roughly four 
times the pay received by their counterparts in the civilian sector. 
The colonialization of civilian posts by military officers, which began in a small 
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way during the Zia regime, has greatly expanded under Ershad. The police service has 
been virtually taken over by retired military officers, while at least 28 senior positions in 
the secretariat are held by army officers loyal to Ershad. Serving or retired members of 
the armed forces head 14 of the 22 large and lucrative public corporations. Corruption in 
these corporations is endemic with military officers pocketing substantial amounts of 
foreign exchange from shady deals. Almost any transaction involves 'ghoosh' (bribe), 
with the result that the poor cannot gain access to any legal rights. Martial law 
categorically rejects accusations against military officers. However, in 1981 when a 
civilian government briefly took charge following General Zia's assassination, Air Vice 
Marshal (Retd) M.G. Tawab was held and charged with embezzlement of government 
funds. The Air Force officer obtain £300,000 for himself in connection with the purchase 
of a Boeing 707 for the national airline. At the time, Tawab was the Minister in Charge 
of Civil Aviation [13]. 
The substantial share of military officers in political power has been the main factor 
in ensuring their loyalty to Ershad. About 40 percent of his successive Council of 
Ministers are drawn from the armed services [14]. More importantly, senior military 
officers act as a 'super cabinet' for Ershad, who discusses all important policy measures 
with them before these measures are formally placed before the Council of Ministers. This 
practice clearly reinforces the argument of those who reject the notion that the military 
regimes are consensus builders. However, it would have been extremely difficulty for 
Bangladesh's military leaders to assert their dominance over the rest of society, if it had 
failed to address some important issues and contradictions within the armed forces. 
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Another reasons for the chaos in the country was the manner in which the AL 
rehabilitated elements of the bureaucracy ideologically more inclined towards Islam and 
Pakistan, and pardoned those who had identified with the Pakistanis' during the war of 
independence. Surely the Bangladeshis who had suffered so much at the hands of the 
Pakistanis' could expect some of those perpetrators of crime to be put on trial. For 
reasons still not clear, Sheikh Mujib failed to pursue this initiative, and the lack of political 
judgement on Mujib's part was reflected in the rehabilitation of these elements in the 
power bloc following the coup. 
A similar line of development also began to develop in the army. In early 1973 
and 1974, 28,000 Bengali regular officers and soldiers returned from captivity in Pakistan 
and were generally forced to accept posts and ranks beneath those who had previously been 
junior to them. Three full battalions of the East Bengal Regiment, one of the best in the 
Pakistan army, returned intact but were deliberately split up and dispersed throughout the 
army [15]. 
In part it was merely defensive tactics on the part of those who were already 
enjoying the fruits of office, but there was unquestionably also a certain Indian influence 
at work. Both Mujib and his Indian patrons suspected that these returnees might be more 
sympathetic to Pakistan and Islam, and rather less enthusiastic about Bangladesh's status 
as an Indo-Soviet client. Also the fact that Mujib raised a militia, the Rakhi Bahini, 
trained by Indian officers and numbering 25,000 (against 55,000 in the regular armed 
forces) created a severe problem of factionalism within the army officer corps. Indeed, 
developments since the coup reinforced these contradictions, albeit non-antagonist in 
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nature, between those who actively fought in the liberation war (the freedom fighters) and 
those who returned from Pakistan following the war (the repatriates). The contradictions 
were finally resolved with the coup in 1982 when General Ershad (a repatriate) captured 
state power and firmly admonished the freedom fighters to tow the line. 
The Bangladesh military, deeply influenced politically during the war of 
independence, also resented the fact that they were ignored by the AL in the composition 
of the power bloc which was essentially represented by the petit-bourgeois elements within 
the AL, the countries, and the comprador bourgeoisie, though the position of the latter 
class was pushed to a very marginal position in that power bloc [16]. 
However, the second and probably the most important factor which alienated the 
military from the power bloc was the emergence of a serious challenge to the AL from the 
left wing political parties like the Jatio Samajtrantik Dal (JSD) and the underground Maoist 
movement led by Siraj Sikdar of the Sarbohara party (Proletarian Party). A good number 
of disillusioned party members, including military officers, carried out large-scale 
propaganda against the AL, and committed covert political murders in the country. The 
objective conditions of the country helped earn sufficient popularity for the JSD, which 
became the only political party capable of challenging the state represented by the AL and 
its cronies [17]. Ironically, the JSD was the radical wing of the AL which defected in 
1972. The pathetic state of political and economic realities that persisted during Mujib's 
rule also allowed the JSD to secretly penetrate the military to form the clandestine People's 
Revolutionary Army (PRA) within the enlisted ranks of the regular Bangladesh army. The 
influence of the PRA did not become evident until late 1975, when in concert with some 
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guerilla fighters from the liberation struggle they launched general revolt (soldier's mutiny) 
which was violently suppressed with the hanging of Colonel Taher and jail sentences for 
its members [18]. Central to the demands of the PRA was the establishment of a 
"revolutionary army", protecting the interest of the peasants, abolition of hierarchy within 
the military, the abolition of colonial rules and regulations that guide army discipline, 
higher pay for soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and educational and housing 
facilities for soldiers and their families [19]. 
Another important reasons which might have influenced the military to act was 
AL's decision to impose one party rule some months before the coup. If Mujib had his 
way, the armed forces were to be held to their existing strength (55,000), while the Rakhni 
Bahini, loyal to Mujib, would be expanded to 130,000 men, with a brigade positioned in 
each of Bangladesh's 19 districts, and would receive almost all new equipment purchases 
for the foreseeable future. The 19 districts were to be governed politically by AL 
stalwarts, and policed by the Rakhni Bahini. Such a move would have effectively 
compromised the Bangladesh miliary as a viable institution. 
The military coup in August 1975 changed all this. Following a brief power 
struggle within the military, General Zia consolidated his position and assumed the 
presidency with the help of a rather severe martial law administration. The Rakhi Bahini 
was disbanded; the JSD and other political parties were banned. Islam was invoked to 
rationalize all policies, and the constitution was amended to pay compensation for all 
nationalized property, effectively abolishing the state's commitment to socialism. Foreign 
private investment was encouraged, and the administration was centralized, as opposed to 
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the AL's program of decentralization. Zia redefined socialism to mean 'economic and 
social justice.' Repatriated officers in the army were given top jobs, and the military 
created a political party in which the top leadership was accorded to pro-Pakistani elements 
[20]. However, the most urgent priority was that of re-establishing the chain of command 
within the officer corps, and reasserting officers' authority over the private soldiers who 
had tasted power briefly in November 1975. This was not an easy task, as counter coups 
followed, with rebellious junior officers invariably taking the initiative. Re-establishing 
control over the rank and file, and cutting away at the influence of the JSD, has proven 
an even more difficult task. 
General Zia would have found it difficult, if not almost impossible, to carry out his 
fiscal measures and social programs without the active support of a group of politicians 
who helped him form a political party, the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party). The BNP 
was composed of (1) his factional supporters within the army and bureaucracy, (2) the 
right wing Muslim League and other Islamic Fundamentalists completely isolated under 
the AL's rule, and (3) politicians from various political parties, including the AL hungry 
for their share of the national cake. Some elements of the left, including Zafar and 
Enayetullah, also joined the cabinet, effectively unmasking their true identity [21]. 
On the surface, the BNP appeared as a hotch-potch representing the interests of the 
petit-bourgeois ignored by the AL; but in reality the BNP was conceived to legitimize the 
ambitions of General Zia and that of the military. Civilian politicians merely existed to 
carry votes for him in the so-called parliaments, and the bureaucracy existed to execute 
local self-help and canal-digging projects. 
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Earlier we have observed how the United States, Saudi Arabia and other 
industrialized countries bolstered Zia's regime through various aid projects, and under the 
International Military and Training Program (IMET) which brings Bengali officers to the 
United States to study 'management techniques'. The State Department's rationale for the 
IMET program is "to improve an institution which contributes to stability in Bangladesh 
and the region" [22]. 
The assassination of Zia in an attempted coup in 1981, and the escalation of the war 
in the Hill Tracts clearly invalidates the State Departments' consideration of the 
Bangladesh military as a stable force. Clearly, stability cannot be secured by a show of 
arms. Among other things, stability requires basic social justice and equality. An 
institution like the military, which rules in favor of Bangladesh's narrow elite, is simply 
not capable of providing the conditions for stability. 
General Ershad has more or less continued to follow Zia's program of 'economic 
and social justice', employing essentially the means by which Zia perpetrated his regime. 
Only this time his opposition includes the BNP, and allies include the JSD. Also, he has 
evolved a formula designed to enable the army to play a role in the government without 
offending civilians and politicians. Ershad has also formed a political party, the Jatio 
Party, attracting several top BNP and AL leaders. Zia's 'Gram Sarkar' has become 
Ershad's 'Upazilla's' (sub-district village councils) that will act as local centers of 
government activity, and in doctored parliamentary election in 1986, which the BNP 
boycotted and the AL participated, the Jatio Party (National Party) of General Ershad quite 
predictably won a majority of seats. Although the trappings of democracy have been 
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restored, the government relies on the military to keep it in power. In the face of a 
sophisticated and well organized combination of terrorism, bribery, and manipulation, the 
military regime has more or less given in and formed an alliance with the local elite at the 
expense of the peasants and the working class. This alliance is, of course, of crucial 
importance in supporting and maintaining the existing power structure. 
What is important here, however, is that though now the state power is exclusively 
controlled by the repatriated army, the power bloc is composed of other class elements, 
comprador bourgeoisie, foreign capitalists, and some members of the bureaucracy. The 
speciality of the present articulation between the power bloc and state apparatus in 
Bangladesh is such that, on the one hand, the military controls the state power, and, on the 
other hand, this articulation has assumed the form of a competitive party system in which 
the ruling party represents the interests of the military. The military leaders were able to 
split the opposition, since the opposition was in complete disarray and was constantly 
bickering among themselves over strategy to deal with the politicized armed forces. 
Indeed, the history of political parties since the first coup in 1975 is one of break-ups and 
divisions, from outright hostility toward praetorian rule to 'sweet-deal accommodations' 
with the military backed political parties [23]. However, the Marxist Party, Sarbohara 
Party, has so far resisted several attempts by the generals to co-opt the party into the 
mainstream. Colonel Ziauddin, a dissident of the Bangladesh army, now appears to head 
the organization. 
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Presently with the use of leaflets, pamphlets and circulars, the Sarbohara party bitterly 
criticizes the activities of the Ershadi military regime, and urges the people of Bangladesh 
to overthrow the government through armed struggle as well as a mass movement. 
The JSD, the revolutionary aspirations of so many during the mid-70's, has 
abandoned all pretenses to Marxism, and has split following the first coup into two camps: 
the JSD (the National Socialist Party) and the BSD (Bangladesh Socialist Party). 
Obviously, socialism has a negative connotation in present day JSD politics. It is a far cry 
from the JSD leaders who called for an uninterrupted revolution under the banner of the 
People’s Revolutionary Army when the first coup occurred in 1975. Not surprisingly, a 
prominent leader of JSD who died in 1993, Major (Retd.) Jalil even suggested that the 
national parliament under Ershad's government should include members of the armed 
forces [24]. According to Jalil, such representation would enable soldiers to participate 
in nation building and would serve as a forum to air their grievances. Jalil further 
suggested that questionnaires be sent from parliament to members of the armed forces, 
police and para-military brigades to determine perceptions of the armed forces playing an 
active role in government. 
If it were not for vehement opposition from the politically conscientious segment 
of Bangladesh society, the idea of praetorian representation in parliament might just have 
materialized. General Ershad endorsed, this proposition because his way of thinking also 
coincided with Jalil's. 
Four months before assuming power in Bangladesh's second successful military 
coup in 1982, General Ershad, who was the army chief under Zia, had declared that the 
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only way to ensure stability in Bangladesh was "to give a proper role to the military in our 
society" through constitutional means [25]. 
The military hierarchy's desire to find a perpetual political role for the armed 
forces has met stiff resistance from all comers of Bangladesh. In the process many died 
when the state unleashed a reign of terror on the society effectively reinforcing the 
argument that it has a 'monopoly on the coercive use of force'-a poignant and a rather 
disturbing trend which is addressed in the chapter that follows. 
86 
NOTES 
1. J. Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, Eds., Military Rule in Chile: 
Dictatorship and Oppositions. (Baltimore: MD, The John Hopkins University Press, 
1986), 5. 
2. Henri J. Barkey, Why Military Regimes Fail. The Perils of Transition, Armed 
Forces and Society. Vol. 16, No. 2, (Winter 1990), 169. 
3. Talukdar Maniruzzam, Military Withdrawal From Politics: A Comparative 
Study. (Dhaka: Bangladesh, University Press Limited, 1988), 51. 
4. Fred Halliday and Maxine Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution. (London, 
U.K., Verso, 1983), 9. 
5. Talukdar Maniruzzam, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath. (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh, Bangladesh Books International, 1981), 7. 
6. Syed Serajul Islam, Bangladesh: State and Economic Strategy. (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh, University Press Limited, 1988), 91. 
7. Ibid., 94. 
8. Rehman Sobhan, The Crisis of External Dependence: The Political Economy 
of Foreign Aid to Bangladesh. (Dhaka: Bangladesh, University Press Limited, 1982),44. 
9. For example, Shafiul Azam, former Chief Secretary of East Pakistan, who was 
dismissed by the AL government, was reinstated after the August coup. 
10. Golam Azam, the leader of right wing Jamat-E-Islam party, was allowed to 
reenter Bangladesh by General Zia in 1978. Golam Azam actively collaborated with the 
Pakistan Army and prepared the 'list'. 
11. Some of the other steps Zia took to "legitimize" his regime included 
denationalization of the major industries, removal of all restrictions to private foreign 
investment, lifting of monetary ceiling on private investment and credits for rural 
development. 
12. Syed Serajul Islam, The State in Bangladesh Under Zia (1975-81), Asian 
Survey. Vol. XXIV, No. 5, (May 1984), 558. 
13. Tom Learmont and Francis Rolt, Underdeveloping Bangladesh: 225 Years of 
British Involvement. War on Want. (London, UK, 1981), 9. 
87 
14. Francis Robinson, Ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of India. Pakistan. 
Bangladesh. Sri Lanka. Nepal. Bhutan and Maldives. (Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 222. 
15. Syed Serajul Islam, Bangladesh: State and Economic Strategy. (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh, University Press Ltd., 1988), 135. 
16. Emajuddin Ahamed, Military Rule and the Myth of Democracy, (Dhaka, 
Bangladesh, University Press Ltd., 1988), 51. 
17. Lawrence Lifschultz, Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution. (London: UK, Zed 
Press, 1981), 19-20. 
18. Ibid., 34. 
19. Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade. (New Delhi, India, South Asian 
Publisher, 1982), 29. 
20. In Zia's first cabinet several Islamic fundamentalist were inducted. These 
elements opposed the creation of Bangladesh. Indeed, Shah Aziz, Zia's Prime Minister, spoke 
at the U.N. in 1971 opposing the dismemberment of Pakistan. General Ershad also included 
these elements in his cabinet. 
21. According to Emajuddin Ahamed in his book, Military Rule and the Mvth of 
Democracy [88], 10,000 leaders and political workers belonging to the JSD were in jail 
during this time., 105. 
22. Betsy Hartmann and James Boyce, Needless Hunger: Voices From a Bangladesh 
Village. San Francisco, Institute of Food and Development Policy, (1979), 47. 
23. The Jamaat-E-Islam party and the JSD participated in "doctored" elections 
organized by General Zia (1975-81). The AL provided the required 'legitimacy' along with 
the JSD and Jamaat-E-Islam parties to Ershad's rule by participating in local government and 
national elections in 1986. It is rumored that in 1986, the AL leader, Sheikh Hasina received 
substantial monetary compensation for participating in those elections. 
24. Jalil, "An Angry Man Speaks Out," Dhaka Courier. (June 28 - July 4, 1984), 4. 
25. Mohammad Ataur Rahman, Bangladesh in 1983: A Turning Point for the 
Military, Asian Survey. Vol. XXIV, No. 2, February 1984, p.21. 
CHAPTER V 
THE POLITICS OF REPRESSION: PRAETORIAN ANSWER TO DISSENT 
This analysis of the coup in Bangladesh maintains that the petit-bourgeois 
orientation of the officer corps (a result of class background and/or professional 
socialization) predisposes it to act on behalf of the ruling class. Intervention in politics, 
therefore, is ultimately a defense of the capitalist structure, and in doing so the regime has 
on several occasions, backed by the 'constitutional' use of military 'courts' and military 
'fire-power', contained the political demands of its fellow soldiers, minorities and the 
masses in general. In analyzing the military, Lenin states that the military in a capitalist 
society operates as an organized force-coercion in the Leninist sense backed by 
constitutional/legal, class/structural and ideological perceptions and institutions. [1] Earlier 
the paper discussed the ideological influence on military officers undergoing training in 
U.S. and British military academies. This chapter, therefore, examines the political 
repression as opposed to economic repression the junta has exercised to further and 
consolidate their interests. 
However, an attempt to discuss the specific aspects of repression in a society so 
fundamentally imbued with repressive elements confronts one with great difficulties. The 
paper has analyzed two different areas where the repressive actions of the state have been 
so brutal and relentless that they may be discussed not simply as repressive, but, as a 
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general and pervasive attempt to forcefully and systematically mold individual behavior. 
Indeed, these may be seen as more precise and deliberate acts designed to inflict harm on 
individuals so as to directly warn others of the consequences of challenging state authority. 
The Bangladesh military does this by imposing 'martial law' when the institutions of the 
state are threatened, by hanging soldiers who contradict the 'wisdom' of praetorian rule, 
and engaging in war with sophisticated weapons to silence the demands for basic human 
rights. Thus, these are more than simple acts of repression; they are acts of terror 
unleashed on the population by the state. 
Although statistical information on this subject is still scarce, most authorities are 
agreed in admitting that, since the military took power hundreds of soldiers, students and 
political activists have perished for voicing dissent, and thousands more killed (on both 
sides) in an effort to quell the autonomy movement of the 'Chakmas' in Eastern 
Bangladesh. Firstly, my focus will be on the autonomy movement led by the Buddhist 
tribals, and, secondly, an attempt will be made to recognize the degree of repression 
within the military. 
The Autonomy Movement 
Now the most militarized region in Bangladesh is the southeastern district of 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). This is tribal guerilla territory, home of a decade long 
insurgency that has pitted ethnic Buddhists, known as ’Chakmas", against both the army 
and ethnic Bengali settlers. The 13,200 square kilometer forest and bamboo-clad hill 
region is wedged against Burma and India’s Mizoram and Tripura states. Traditionally the 
hills have been home to the tribals (0.05% of the total population of Bangladesh) and, 
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therefore, the root of the autonomy movement lies in the fear of being swamped by a 
Bengali majority. There is much truth in this fear as we shall see. 
Until 1964, the Buddhists in Bangladesh and their land, much of which is farmed 
by shifting cultivation, were protected from encroachment by the 1900 Chittagong Hill 
Tracts Regulation No. 1 [2]. 
After it was revoked, 6,000 acres, which represented 40% of the ethnic Chakmas 
settled and cultivated land, was flooded by the Kaptai Dam electricity generating scheme 
(a project of the then military president, Ayub Khan of Pakistan). The result was the 
dispersal of a large number of ethnic Chakmas from their land without adequate 
compensation. Unsatisfactory rehabilitation efforts and a continuous military influx of 
Bengali settlers from the plains fueled resentment, resulting in a heating up of armed 
rebellion in the early 1980s [3]. Although the problem in this area is an old one, it 
became worse following the coup in 1975, because many guerrillas of the liberation war 
(freedom fighters), particularly those who were staunch Mujib loyalists, had fled to the 
Hill Tracts and sought sanctuary among the rebels. Partly as a result of this, the military 
government of General Zia intensified the operations to cleanse the Hill Tracts of 
'undesirables'. 
A statement by the movement, the Shanti Bahini (Peace Army, numbering 6,000 
active armed personnel) charges that the Bangladesh army had unleashed a reign of terror, 
including rapes, summary executions, indiscriminate burnings and lootings of entire 
villages, and the creation of 'strategic villages' which resemble concentration camps. 
To escape these atrocities, many ethnic Chakmas have escaped to India from where 
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they operate their military bases. New Delhi reckons it houses around 50,000 refugees 
from Bangladesh. In 1983, with perhaps a quarter of the nation's army tied up in Hill 
Tracts, the military president offered amnesty to the Shanti Bahini rebels. Understandably, 
the response was poor. Indeed recent reports suggest that the armed struggle has 
intensified and the military has suffered heavy losses [5]. 
However, the most important dimension to this tragedy has some consequences for 
multinational companies, most notably, the British-Dutch petroleum company, Shell. 
In May 1981, Shell signed a $60 million dollar oil exploration agreement with the 
military government to prospect in the area. Also assisting the government with a 
generous loan of Sf330 million was the Asian Development Bank (Britain is a major 
contributor of ADB). In fact, the army has made is attitude absolutely clear. On 26 May 
1979, Brigadier Hannan declared at a public meeting in the Hill Tracts: "We want only 
the soil, and not the people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts"[6]. Clearly this suggests the 
importance of the area to vested interests including multinational corporations. To this end 
the military has sought and found military aid from the United States and Britain. British 
officers of brigadier and group captain rank (including one colonel from the famous SAS) 
were on loan to the Bangladesh government to train indigenous officers in counter 
insurgency skills [7]. Following the United States rationale the British government also 
provides aid to bring about 'stability' in the region. However, it is difficult to sustain how 
sophisticated telecommunications gear and training soldiers can justify Britain's position 
viz-a-viz Bangladesh's stability. 
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The purpose of all this (the tragedy in the Hills) is clearly to evict the ethnic Chakmas 
from their homes to make way for multinationals to carry on with their prospects and 
exploit the minorities [8]. 
Amnesty International reports that a bill sanctioned by the so-called parliament, 
"Disturbed Areas Bill," was passed which would allow the military to shoot to kill people 
on mere suspicion [9]. The bill would allow officers to shoot and even kill anyone 
engaged in 'unlawful activity', broadly described as acts prejudicial to the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and security of Bangladesh and the maintenance of public order. 
Literally translated the order would imply that ethnic Chakmas (children and women 
included) seen in the area designated "disturbed" are liable to be shot. Indeed, the Bar 
Council of Bangladesh issued a statement describing the powers as 'draconian' [10]. 
Bangladeshis brave enough to criticize these 'draconian' measures suffered immensely for 
their actions. For example, Saiful Islam Dildar, a human rights activist based in Dhaka, 
was arrested in early April 1989 under the Special Powers Act 1974, another 'draconian' 
law which empowers the state to arrest anyone without any justifiable cause. No reason 
for his arrest was given, but it is believed that it might be connected with a press release 
issued on the 19th February 1989, by the Bangladesh Human Rights Commission of which 
Mr. Dildar is Secretary-General. The Commission urged the government to withdraw 
three bills in connection with CHT from Ershad's 'parliament', arguing that the violence 
in the Hills would escalate if these bills became law. One of the these bills was the 
"Disturbed Areas Bill". What else can one expect from an institution that has historically 
perceived the 'gun' to be the answer to all grievances? 
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For example, between 1958 and 1982 the total number of coups worldwide amounted to 
195 or over 8 per year. 
Besides confronting the guerrillas in the Hills, the military regimes of General 
Ershad and Zia have also settled internal wranglings with utmost brutality. Though these 
brutalities have been covered extensively in some works, the attempt here is to show how 
these actions of the military wrecked the revolutionary JSD, and ultimately led one of the 
factions of the JSD into forming an alliance with General Ershad's political party, the Jatio 
Party. 
The class contradictions within the military surfaced when the JSD penetrated the 
Bangladesh army and launched a general revolt to alter the hierarchial and colonial 
structure of the military. The idea was to revolutionize the military from below, and the 
opportunity came in November 1975 when the country's military leaders were fighting 
among themselves to assert authority following the bloody coup in August. (For a brief 
period Khandakar Mushtaque, a right wing member of the Awami League assumed the 
presidency. Mushtaque is widely believed to have previous knowledge of the coup). In 
the power struggle that followed, General Zia, with the help of Colonel Taher and soldiers 
loyal to the JSD emerged as the victor and completely routed the pro-Mujib faction in a 
bloody shootout. The soldiers then spread through the cantonments chanting "All Sepoys 
are brothers, we want the blood of officers." Thousands of leaflets containing the 12- 
point demands of Colonel Taher were distributed among the public in the streets and 
among ordinary soldiers in the cantonments. 
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The preamble of the 12-point demands reads: 
Our revolution is not simply to change one leadership for another. This 
revolution is for one purpose-the interest of the oppressed classes. For 
that the entire structure of the Armed Forces must be changed. For many 
days we were the Army of the richer class. The rich have used us for their 
own interests. The events of August 15 are but one example. However, 
this time we have revolted neither for the cause of the rich nor on their 
behalf. This time we have revolted alongside the masses of the country. 
From today onwards the Armed Forces of the Nation shall build themselves 
as the defender of the country's oppressed classes. [11]. 
What followed is a classic case of betrayal paralleled only by Mir Zafar during 
colonial rule in Bengal. (Mir Zafar, the commander in chief of the Bengal army under 
Nawab Sirzzuddawla effectively allowed the British, for a certain price, to colonize 
Bengal, now Bangladesh. In the Battle of Plassey in 1757, the Nawab was about to 
confront the English when Mir Zafar deserted the army to facilitate the advance of British 
troops). 
Colonel Taher and the People's Revolutionary Army trusted Zia to enforce their 
program of a peaceful transition of the country to socialism which would uphold the spirit 
of Taher's 12-point demands. Late in November, Zia betrayed his commitment and led 
another coup in which almost all the leaders of the JSD at the national level were arrested, 
including Colonel Taher, Major Jalil and Rab. The JSD was accused of killing army 
officers and creating dissension among the soldiers. 
Pressed by hawkish officers, Zia installed a special tribunal, which held a secret 
trial of the JSD leaders for their alleged attempts to expand the original mutiny of 
November 7 towards a goal of socialist revolution. Not surprisingly, the tribunal found 
Taher guilty and hanged him in July 1976. 
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Other members of the JSD were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for varying 
terms. 
This, however, did not stop the JSD and its representatives within the army from 
realizing their goal. They struck again in 1977 with even more disastrous results. 
Although the coup attempt lasted only a few hours, it almost toppled the government. 
Eleven senior air officers were killed before Zia's troops overpowered the rebels. The 
People's Revolutionary Army (Biplobi Shainik Sanghstha), the military wing of the JSD 
achieved limited success and won some influence among the sergeants and sergeant-majors 
who are the backbone of the non-officer ranks. 
Zia's response this time was merciless. Several hundred soldiers were tried by 
secret military tribunals and more than 250 were shot or hanged. A major reshuffle of 
army command was carried out, and those suspected of sympathizing with the JSD and the 
PRA were shifted to commands out of Dhaka, and several were given diplomatic posts 
abroad. Later Zia pushed through the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, legitimizing 
all martial law decrees, including the mass murder of all the soldiers following the coup. 
This move by Zia undermined the strength of the PRA within the army and effectively 
compromised the PRA's ability to act militarily. The political wing of the PRA, the JSD, 
also failed to seriously challenge Zia's regime for two reasons. Firstly, the entire 
leadership was behind bars and, therefore, failed to plan strategies to challenge the regime. 
Secondly, through sheer manipulation, corruption and graft Zia was able, at least 
temporarily, to bring about some semblance of stability, and in this endeavor he was 
helped by increased aid money, foreign investment and political engineering through 
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elections. Zia also allowed concessions to Islamists and declared that the ideological force 
of Islam would best serve the various problems facing the country [12]. This naturally 
appealed to the masses, who now believed that perhaps Islam, and not the empty promises 
of unscrupulous politicians, is the answer to improving their wretched condition. This was 
a politically astute move on Zia's part, and brought in a substantial amount of petro-dollars 
to bolster his regime. Also, the fact that revolution espoused by the JSD was portrayed 
as an anti-thesis of religion offended many traditional Islamists and seriously weakened the 
base of JSD support. 
But other divisions within the politicized military remained, which culminated in 
the assassination of Zia in 1981. In a failed coup attempt some disgruntled officers with 
nationalist leanings failed to capture state power and were killed under mysterious 
circumstances. Although the events surrounding the coup attempt are still not clear, it is 
widely believed that the present president, Ershad, was also involved. Though it is 
difficult to establish the validity of this claim, no one seems to suggest otherwise. The 
swift trial and subsequent execution of a large number of army officers lends credence to 
the argument that Ershad might have been involved, and the fact that the government 
failed to present a comprehensive and detailed report of the coup allowed different versions 
of it to surface in different quarters. 
Whatever might be the reasons for the attempted coup in 1981, the fact remains 
that the cycle of violence unleashed following the first one is likely to dominate the politics 
of military rule given the 'mercenary' nature of the institution and the ideological 
orientation of its officers. In the final analysis these coups are staged basically to reinforce 
97 
class interests, and to articulate institutional cohesion with the bureaucracy, and as 
Schumpeter maintains, "without protection by some non-bourgeois groups, the bourgeoisie 
is politically helpless and unable not only to lead its nation but even to take care of its 
particular class interest. Which amounts to saying that it needs a master." [13]. This 
could very well illustrate the position of the petty bourgeoisie in Bangladesh. 
The JSD and its military wing, the PRA, failed to emphasize the true nature of 
revolutionary change beyond the cantonments, and they suffered the wrath of the 
repressive organs of the praetorian state. They also failed to mobilize support among the 
masses who would otherwise have carried their revolutionary slogans if the messages were 
clear and more comprehensive. This reflects the failure of JSD theoreticians to appeal to 
the peasants, who are concentrated in the rural areas culturally, politically, and 
economically distant from the center. Surely, for a revolution (in the Marxist-Leninist 
tradition) to mature, the conditions must be exploited at grass roots level to have any 
degree of viability. 
Also, in the absence of an effective opposition to a military solution, the war in the 
Hill Tracts is likely to continue. Though the government is pumping in a substantial 
amount of funds in pursuance of neutralizing the area, the Shanti Bahini will carry on with 
its armed struggle against the Bangladesh army and the settlers [14]. Attempts to promote 
ethnic participation in mainstream politics have so far failed. 
Since Zia took care of dissent within the cantonments, Ershad has so far enjoyed 
a fruitful alliance with his fellow generals and soldiers. However, Ershad never hesitates 
to contain dissent with impunity when his position is attacked, sometimes with needless 
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violence in the streets and cities of Bangladesh. The most vocal opposition has been the 
students of various Bangladeshi universities and colleges, the media and several prominent 
politicians, including Khaleda Zia, the wife of the assassinated president, Ziaur Rahman. 
Khaleda's political party, the BNP has consistently refused to participate in doctored 
elections. The reason, of course, is personal since Ershad had toppled Zia's BNP 
government in 1982. 
General Ershad is too harsh on the media. For example, in 1986, the country's 
most popular political weekly was banned for publishing articles supposedly slandering the 
Armed Forces [16]. Also, when students demonstrating against military rule became 
intense, Ershad and Zia never hesitated to close universities and ban all student unions and 
politics for an indefinite period of time [17]. In 1983, several students were shot to death 
when these students gathered in front of the government secretariat to oppose Ershad's 
"Education Policy" which made the study of Arabic compulsory for university students. 
Many believe this was an attempt by Ershad to cultivate stronger ties with Islamic 
countries, especially, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the hope of generating more aid from 
these countries. The intensity of violence throughout Bangladesh that followed the release 
of the "Education Policy" and the unprovoked attack on these students forced the 
government to back-off. This round, at least, went to the democrats. However, the 
litany of further abuse by the Generals is endless, which only brings despair and frustration 
for millions of Bangladeshis hoping to end military rule, once and for all. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summary, this essay has endeavored to explain the persistence of praetorian rule 
in Bangladesh on the basis of Marxist class analysis. 
The thesis has examined the process of societal formation in Bangladesh which, by 
definition, is the function of the process of class formation from a historical perspective. 
Also, in our analysis (following Marx and Lenin) the state is not an impartial referee in 
the 'power bloc', but is a vehicle for the realization of the interests of the dominant class 
--an agency of class domination which gives the illusion of serving the general will, while 
in reality acting as a cloak for class interests. Attempts by the military-bureaucratic 
apparatus to cultivate a picture of the state as being above a particular group of class 
interests constitutes an ideological strategy to legitimize its own dominant position. The 
state in turn involves itself in a constant exercise of legitimating the existing order through 
a variety of agencies and institutions. 
Clearly, then, Marx's notion of dialectics restructures our thinking about reality in 
a way that is fundamentally opposed to mainstream scholarship (as demonstrated earlier) 
which perceives the problems of political stability from some superficial conjectures. For 
instance, some mainstream scholars attribute poverty, hunger and underdevelopment in the 
Third World to overpopulation, too much government, scarcity of resources and a host of 
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other explanations. Nothing has been added in this essay that did not previously exist. 
It is a matter of where and how one draws boundaries and establishes units in which to 
think about Bangladesh's grim reality. 
Marx's claim that dialectical materialism "is in its essence critical and 
revolutionary" is indeed positive. It is revolutionary because it allows us to see present 
as a moment through which our society passes and because it forces us to examine where 
it has come from and where it is leading as part of learning what it is. [1]. 
Dialectical materialism, therefore, enables us to grasp the reality and identify the 
villains and prepares us to confront the challenges in a manner which makes effective 
action possible. And in this vein, Salman Rushdie's novel, Midnight's Children, is a bold 
attempt to identify the perpetrators of social and economic injustice in South Asia. 
Rushdie's novel is centrally an attack on the indigenous ruling classes in Pakistan, 
Bangladesh (praetorian states) and India. It is a devastating political indictment of those 
who rule these countries, and, by implication, of those who placed them in their present 
positions of power and privilege. Midnight's Children is essentially Alavi's thesis 
fictionalized. Rushdie's chosen attack is, of course, the military and the bureaucracy. 
Reinforcing the arguments of Rushdie and Alavi, this paper has demonstrated how 
under military rule Bangladesh has degenerated into a secretive priesthood of power 
dominated by the military. This, of course, has been possible because of economic and 
military assistance from the advanced capitalist countries (USA, UK, Japan, etc.) which 
bolsters Bangladesh's narrow ruling class at the expense of the masses. The economic 
interests of the West seem to dictate the necessity of keeping Bangladesh under its control. 
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Under such a social formation, the workers and peasants have been continuously 
exploited and have remained unorganized due to the absence of genuine revolutionary 
movement to topple the ruling class. But bearing Bertolt Brecht in mind who said, "It is 
not Communism that is radical, it is capitalism", the revolutionaries in Bangladesh must 
in the end win the final battle because in the words of Markovitz, "it is capitalism that has 
brought with it a quadruple alienation, of men from the process of production which had 
previously guaranteed their livelihood, of men from the products of their work, which 
became transformed into commodities; of men from themselves, insofar as they lived only 
in order to work at meaningless labor; and of men from their fellows whom they met as 
competitors on the market place" [2]. 
The alienation which permanent hunger creates in Bangladesh is deep. As we have 
seen, the praetorian state, given its economic structure, benefits a small minority and is 
largely responsible for this alienation. 
Naturally, in such conditions the masses will lose their willingness to be ruled 
under the conditions imposed by this order and thus, act to topple it and institute a new 
order. Little more than a spark is seen as necessary to initiate this process. And yet in 
practice such is not always the case. 
Theda Skocpol in an excellent essay suggests that the problem lies with those 
conceptualizations of revolution which fail to take account of the ability of the state to use 
force in successfully maintaining a dominant position. From within such a perspective it 
is not only the disposition of the masses but also the disposition of the state in the wider 
political and economic context of the world system which must be considered [3], 
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Therefore, it might be a long and arduous battle for the peasants in Bangladesh but a battle 
in which victory ultimately will be theirs. 
Essentially, then, the key to understanding political events and the effects of 
political and economic decisions in Bangladesh is to relate politics to class interests. To 
perceive the reality differently is a sham and is a fundamental misconception. 
Under intense political pressure from opposing political parties, trade unions and 
student demonstrations throughout Bangladesh in December 1992, General Ershad 
voluntarily relinquished the office of President and handed over power to a care-taker 
government headed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Justice Shahabuddin. 
Immediately after the assumption of Office of President, Justice Shahabuddin announced 
parliamentary elections which were held in the presence of foreign observers in March, 
1991. 
The BNP emerged victorious with a majority of seats in parliament. The armed 
forces were extremely pleased with the results since the BNP was created by one of their 
own, the assassinated General Zia. General Zia's wife, Khaleda Zia, is presently the 
Prime Minister and seems to be enjoying a cordial relationship with the top brass of the 
armed forces, who refer to her as "Bhabi" (sister-in-law). Not surprisingly, therefore, the 
military continues to have a dominant influence in the affairs of the state. It seems 
unlikely, therefore, that any political party, if it were to assume the mantle of state 
leadership under the prevailing power structure, will have absolute control over the armed 
forces. Consequently, the fundamental argument made in this research paper remains 
unaltered, i.e., the Bangladesh armed forces is in the final analysis the armed protector of 
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the ruling class and will remain so as long as Bangladesh is a class based society and lacks 
a revolutionary culture. 
The present government has taken no steps to reduce the defense budget which 
consumes almost thirty percent of the national cake. Indeed, it is saddled with the huge 
debts incurred by its military predecessors. It is not at all certain that a rise of civilian 
government illustrated the triumph of democracy. Therefore, it is difficult to sustain that 
any meaningful change can be anticipated in the lives of ordinary peasants of Bangladesh 
simply because the armed forces have temporarily retreated to the cantonments. If the 
political history is any indication (Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, Thailand, South Korea, 
Guatemala, El Salvador), a group of Bangladeshi officers or maybe a Bangladeshi NCO 
like Doe in Liberia, must be waiting in the wings to act at an appropriate time. 
Moreover, if the United States government and other western donors continue to 
support dictatorships in Bangladesh, as evidenced in Dilara Chowdhury's scholarship, 
Bangladesh and the South Asian International System [4], which categorically blames the 
United States administration for patronizing the military regimes of Zia and Ershad 
through food, commodity and military aid, Bangladeshis, at least, the majority of them 
will continue to suffer under tyranny. 
Therefore, the politics of mass consent built on revolutionary change in society can 
only challenge the armed forces linchpin role in Bangladesh politics. All efforts must be 
made to rebuild the military, making it an instrument of the constitution, rather than of 
military dictators. The armed forces perception should be changed from one of 
domination to that of obedience to civil society. The time to do all this is now. 
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